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ESSAY
THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE, JURISDICTION STRIPPING,

AND THE HAMDAN OPINIONS: A TEXTUALIST
RESPONSE TO JUSTICE SCALIA
*

Steven G. Calabresi
Gary Lawson**

In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, a five to three majority of the United States
Supreme Court held unlawful the Bush Administration's use of military commissions to try alien combatant detainees held at the United States airbase in
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. The most basic issue in Hamdan was whether
the Supreme Court had jurisdiction to hear the case. Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion argued that the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 stripped the
Supreme Court and all other courts ofjurisdiction to hear habeas cases such
as Hamdan's.
Hamdan argued in the Supreme Court that to read the Detainee Treatment Act to strip jurisdiction over pending habeas cases, as Justice Scalia
did, would raise constitutional questions about Congress's power to limit the
Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction. The Hamdan majority did not address this constitutional question because it read the Detainee Treatment Act
to preserve jurisdiction over pending cases. But Justice Scalia's construction
of the statute required him to address Hamdan's constitutional claims. He
casually dismissed concerns about Congress's power to strip the Supreme
Court's jurisdiction by reference to the Exceptions Clause of Article III, § 2,
which he viewed as an explicit authorizationfor Congress to limit the Court's
jurisdiction. While Justice Scalia may have been right on the specificfacts of
Hamdan, his broader claims about Congress's power to strip jurisdiction
from the Supreme Court are textually wrong.
Simply put, Article III requires that the federaljudiciary be able to exercise all of the judicial power of the United States that is vested by the
Constitution and that the Supreme Court must have the final judicial word
in all cases, such as Hamdan's, that raise federal issues. These conclusions
flow quite naturally from an originalist methodology that looks to the objective meaning of the Constitution that would have been held by a hypothetical
* Professor of Law, Northwestern University School of Law. I am grateful to the
Julius Rosenthal Fund for support. We have received generous and invaluable guidance,
some of which we have unwisely ignored, from Jack Beermann, Guido Calabresi, John
McGinnis, Gerry Neuman, James Pfander, David Shapiro, Larry Yackle, and the
participants at workshops at Boston University School of Law and Northwestern University
School of Law. We have also benefited invaluably in our understanding of Article III from
countless conversations over the years with Marty Redish and Akhil Amar. Neither of them
is to blame for the conclusions we reach herein-conclusions with which they both
disagree from different directions. We would like to dedicate this Essay to Justice Scalia,
for whom we both clerked.
** Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law. I am grateful to the Abraham
and Lillian Benton Fund for support.
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reasonable observer in 1788 and that relies primarily on textual, intratextual, and structural arguments. Ironically, one can make a strong case for
Justice Scalia's view of congressional power to control Supreme Court jurisdiction using legislative history and consequentialist arguments-tools that
Justice Scalia normally abjures. But the more one focuses on formalist arguments from text and structure, the more clear it becomes that the Supreme
Court is constitutionally vested with the final judicial say on matters within
(at least the first three of) the heads of jurisdiction granted to the federal
courts in Article III.
Relying on textual, intratextual, and structural arguments, this Essay
argues that, in the same way that the Constitution vests all of the executive
power of the United States in a unitary executive department, the
Constitution vests all judicial power in the federaljudiciary, with the Supreme Court having supervisory power over all other inferior tribunals within
the judicial department. While the Constitution leaves Congress with the
option of creating or not creating lower federal courts, it does not give
Congress the option of creating or designating lower federal courts over which
the Supreme Court does not, at the end of the day, have the last word.
INTRODUCTION

In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, a five to three majority of the United States
Supreme Court held unlawful the Bush Administration's use of military

commissions to try alien combatant detainees held at the United States
airbase in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba-at least until and unless Congress enacted more specific authorization for the composition and procedures of
the commissions. 1 There are many features of the Court's opinion that
we find questionable: its analysis of the wartime scope of the "executive

1. See 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2808 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part) ("[A]s presently
structured, Hamdan's military commission exceeds the bounds Congress has placed on the
President's authority . . . . Because Congress has prescribed these limits, Congress can
change them . . . ."). The commissions were authorized by presidential order on
November 13, 2001, see Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the
War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833, 57,833-36 (Nov. 13, 2001), and the
procedures for the commissions were established by order of Secretary of Defense
Rumsfeld on March 21, 2002, and revised on August 31, 2005. See Dep't of Def., Military
Commission Order No. 1 (Aug. 31, 2005), Procedures for Trials by Military Commissions
of Certain Non-United States Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, codified at 32 C.F.R.
§ 9 (2006). In the fall of 2006, Congress enacted what many assume the Court will
acknowledge as the necessary authorization. See Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L.
No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600. Professor Calabresi had originally thought that the provision
for military commission trial of the Guantanamo detainees was permissible, but he has now
come to the conclusion that the question is unclear. He thinks that aliens resident in the
United States, its territories, and the leasehold property belonging to the United States
(which includes the base at Guantanamo) enjoy the same constitutional rights as do
citizens except that they may not be elected to be Representatives, Senators, Vice
President, or President. Cf. Gerald L. Neuman, Strangers to the Constitution 52-63
(1996) (describing debate over rights of aliens in early American history). If this is correct,
then the Guantanamo detainees are entitled to the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus,
unless Congress has validly suspended the writ (which it may have done because
Guantanamo was recently the scene of a prisoner rebellion).
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Power"2 vested in the President by Article II of the Constitution,3 its construction of the statutes that supposedly limit the President's power to
create and empower military commissions, 4 its interpretation and appli-

cation of treaty provisions, 5 its understanding of the scope of the Authorization for Use of Military Force passed after the September 11th terrorist
attacks, 6 and its understanding of the appropriate role of courts when
reviewing military decisions in times of war. 7 The most basic issue in

Hamdan, however, was whether the Supreme Court even had jurisdiction
to hear the case. Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion vigorously argued
that the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, which declared that "no court,
justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to hear or consider ... [inter alia]
an application for a writ of habeas corpus filed by or on behalf of an alien
detained by the Department of Defense at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba"8 as of
the statute's effective date of December 30, 2005,9 stripped the Supreme
Court and all other courts of jurisdiction to hear habeas cases such as
Hamdan's. 10 If this is correct, the opinion in Hamdan should not have

addressed any other issues.
Professor Calabresi also thinks, as does Professor Lawson, that the Constitution
requires the use of Article III courts when judicial power is exercised in the territories or
leaseholds belonging to the United States. Since military commissioners lack life tenure
and are being asked to punish the Guantanamo detainees, Professor Calabresi thinks the
Military Commissions Act may well be unconstitutional insofar as it allows the judicial
punishment of the Guantanamo detainees, assuming the writ has not been validly
suspended. He further notes that the detention of alien enemy combatants apprehended
on the battlefield for substantial periods of time is not a punitive act requiring an exercise
ofjudicial power but is rather an exercise of the President's executive power to protect the
nation. Indeed, after World War II some alien enemy combatants were detained on U.S.
bases for as long as ten years after the conclusion of the war, and none of them were ever
held to have habeas rights. See Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 777-79 (1950)
(denying habeas relief to prisoners held abroad).
2. U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
3. For a brief account of how the executive power functions, and expands, in wartime
under the Constitution of 1788, see Gary Lawson, Ordinary Powers in Extraordinary
Times: Common Sense in Times of Crisis, 87 B.U. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2007) (on file with
the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter Lawson, Crisis].
4. For a detailed critique of the Court's interpretation of these statutes, see Hamdan,
126 S. Ct. at 2840-42 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
5. See id. at 2850-54 (Alito, J., dissenting).
6. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001).
For a detailed analysis of the Authorization, see generally Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L.
Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization and the War on Terrorism, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 2047
(2005).
7. See Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Terror in the Balance: Security, Liberty,
and the Courts (2006) (defending strong rule of judicial deference to executive decisions
in times of crisis on historical and policy grounds); Lawson, Crisis, supra note 3
(manuscript at 9-21) (grounding Posner/Vermeule thesis in Constitution's original
meaning).

8. Pub. L. No. 109-148, § 1005(e)(1), 119 Stat. 2739, 2742 (to be codified as amended
at 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e)(1)).
9. See id. § 1005(h)(1), 119 Stat. at 2743.
10. See Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2810 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Hamdan argued in the Supreme Court that to read the Detainee

Treatment Act to strip jurisdiction over pending habeas cases, as did
Justice Scalia, "raises grave [constitutional] questions about Congress' authority to impinge upon this Court's appellate jurisdiction."" The
Hamdan majority did not need to address this constitutional question because it (wrongly, in our view) read the Detainee Treatment Act to preserve jurisdiction over pending cases, 12 butJustice Scalia's construction of
the statute required him to address Hamdan's constitutional claims. He
casually dismissed the possibility of any "lurking questions" 1 3 about

Congress's power to strip the Supreme Court's jurisdiction "in light of the
aptly named 'Exceptions Clause' of Article III, § 2, which, in making our
appellate jurisdiction subject to 'such Exceptions and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make,' explicitly permits exactly what Congress
has done here." 14 We think that while Justice Scalia may have been right
on the specific facts of Hamdan,15 his broader claims about Congress's
power to strip jurisdiction from the Supreme Court are textually wrong.
Simply put, Article III requires that the federal judiciary be able to
exercise all of the judicial power of the United States that is vested by the
Constitution and that the Supreme Court must have the final judicial
word1 6 in all cases, such as Hamdan's, that raise federal issues. These
conclusions flow quite naturally from an originalist methodology that
looks to the objective meaning of the Constitution that would have been

held by a hypothetical reasonable observer in 1788 and that relies
primarily on textual, intratextual, and structural arguments.1 7 Ironically,

&

11. Id. at 2764 (majority opinion).
12. See id. at 2764-69. While we take serious issue with Justice Scalia's constitutional
analysis in Hamdan, we agree with his reading of the Detainee Treatment Act, the language
of which pretty clearly purports to deprive federal courts of habeas jurisdiction over cases
filed before December 30, 2005.
13. Id. at 2819 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
14. Id.
15. Our residual doubts about the proper resolution of the jurisdictional issues in
Hamdan stem from considerations external to the broad concerns about jurisdiction
stripping on which we focus in this Essay. See infra text accompanying notes 30-38.
16. We emphasize strongly the word 'judicial." We do not mean to suggest that the
Supreme Court must have the final word with respect to the executive and legislative
departments. To the contrary, we have both long maintained that the interpretative
powers of the Supreme Court, the President, and the Congress are all coequal and
coordinate. See Steven G. Calabresi, Thayer's Clear Mistake, 88 Nw. U. L. Rev. 269 (1993);
Gary Lawson & Christopher D. Moore, The Executive Power of Constitutional
Interpretation, 81 Iowa L. Rev. 1267, 1270 (1996) (defending departmentalist claim that
each branch of government has "an obligation, in the exercise of its granted powers, to
interpret and apply the Constitution"). Our point goes only to the relationship between
the Supreme Court and other federal courts.
17. For descriptions and defenses of this methodology from different but
complementary directions, see Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The
President's Power to Execute the Laws, 104 Yale L.J. 541, 551-59 (1994); Gary Lawson
Guy Seidman, Originalism as a Legal Enterprise, 23 Const. Comment. 47 (2006)
[hereinafter Lawson & Seidman, Originalism]. Professor Calabresi, unlike Professor
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one can make a strong case for Justice Scalia's view of congressional
power to control Supreme Court jurisdiction using legislative history and
consequentialist arguments-tools that Justice Scalia normally abjures.
But the more one focuses on formalist arguments from text and structure, the more clear it becomes that the Supreme Court is constitutionally vested with the final judicial say on matters within (at least the first
three of) the heads ofjurisdiction granted to the federal courts in Article
III.
Justice Scalia has famously argued, as have we, that the Vesting
Clause of Article II constitutionally vests all of the "executive Power" of
the United States1 8 in a President, who personally stands at the apex of a
unitary executive department and exercises supervisory power over all
subordinates within his department.' 9 Similarly, the Vesting Clause of
Article III vests the federal judiciary with all of the federal judicial power,
and by designating the Supreme Court as "Supreme" and other federal
tribunals as "inferior to" the Supreme Court, the Constitution requires
the Supreme Court to have supervisory power over all subordinates
within its department.20 Justice Scalia made precisely such an argument
Lawson, thinks that a practice long accepted by all three branches of the federal
government can become a binding precedent as to constitutional meaning where the text
is ambiguous. He does not think the text of Article III discussed herein is ambiguous, and
he would thus interpret it according to its original plain public meaning. He notes
moreover that since 1875 Congress has read Article III the way we argue it ought to be read
in this Essay and that therefore there are no reliance interests upset by adopting a formal
originalist reading of the text. See infra Part III.
18. The Article II Vesting Clause does not specify that the "executive Power" vested in
the President is the executive power of the United States. Cf. U.S. Const. art. III, § 1
(referring to "judicial Power of the United States"). But as a default rule, the Federal
Constitution refers only to federal powers or institutions unless it specifically says
otherwise-which is why the Bill of Rights in 1791 did not apply to the States
notwithstanding the generality of Amendments II-IX, see Barron v. City of Baltimore, 32
U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 251 (1833), and why Article II does not make the President the Chief
Executive of Illinois or Massachusetts.
19. See, e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 697-99 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
("[T]he Founders conspicuously and very consciously declined to sap the Executive's
strength in the same way they had weakened the Legislature: by dividing the executive
power."); Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 17, at 551-59; Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H.
Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Unitary Executive, PluralJudiciary, 105 Harv. L. Rev.
1153, 1176-79 (1992); Steven G. Calabresi, The Vesting Clauses as Power Grants, 88 Nw. U.
L. Rev. 1377, 1401 (1994) [hereinafter Calabresi, Vesting] ("Congress's tremendous power
to create, abolish, or restructure the whole panoply of governmental offices below the
President and Vice President does not include a power to free those officers from their
constitutional boss."); Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, The Jeffersonian Treaty Clause, 2006
U. Ill. L. Rev. 1, 22-43 [hereinafter Lawson & Seidman, Treaty Clause] (discussing
significance of Constitution's three vesting clauses for each federal department).
20. See Laurence Claus, The One Court that Congress Cannot Take Away:
Singularity, Supremacy, and Article III, 96 Geo. L.J. (forthcoming 2007) (on file with the
Columbia Law Review) (identifying ultimate decisional authority as key element of
"supreme"); James E. Pfander, Article I Tribunals, Article III Courts, and the Judicial
Power of the United States, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 643, 648-49 (2004) [hereinafter Pfander,
Judicial Power] (discussing Framers' decision to create unitary judicial department).
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in the context of Article II in Edmond v. United States, which established
that an officer can only be "inferior" for purposes of the Appointments

Clause 2 1 if he or she has an effective superior. 22 Similarly, a federal court
can be an "inferior" court only if it is subject to review and correction by a
superior. If Congress were, for example, to vest final jurisdiction over
military detention cases from Guantanamo Bay in the D.C. Circuit (or

final jurisdiction over some category of federal cases in the state courts)
without the possibility of Supreme Court review, it would be akin to Congress vesting prosecutorial authority in a special prosecutor without the
possibility of presidential review. Such a special prosecutor, as Justice
Scalia famously argued in Morrison v. Olson, would not be an inferior officer and would improperly wield a portion of the "executive Power" that
is constitutionally vested in the President. 23 Similarly, a lower court not
ultimately answerable to the Supreme Court would not be "inferior" and
would improperly wield a portion of the "judicial Power" that belongs to
the Supreme Court. Thus, while the Constitution leaves Congress with
the option of creating or not creating lower federal courts, it does not

give Congress the option of creating or designating lower federal courts
over which the Supreme Court does not, at the end of the day, have the
last word.
In Part I of this Essay, we sketch Congress's constitutional power to
structure the federal courts. We identify the restraints placed on that

power by the Vesting Clause of Article III and by the Constitution's use of
"supreme" and "inferior" to describe different kinds of federal courts.
While there are strong historical and consequentialist reasons to read
those terms to allow the creation of "inferior" courts that have the last
judicial word on various questions, the weight of textual, intratextual, and
structural arguments points toward a hierarchical federal judiciary with
the Supreme Court at the apex. 2 4 In particular, the term "inferior" in the

Appointments Clause and "supreme" in the Supremacy Clause are best
understood to describe hierarchical relationships, which points strongly
toward a hierarchical understanding of the identical terms in Articles I

and III.
In Part II, we show that, contrary to Justice Scalia's suggestion, the
Exceptions Clause does not provide authority for altering this structure.
21. U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 ("Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such
inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in
the Heads of Departments.").
22. 520 U.S. 651, 662-64 (1997).
23. 487 U.S. at 697, 715-23 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting). The majority in Morrison
disagreed and concluded that the special prosecutor was indeed an inferior officer. See id.
at 670-73 (majority opinion). We think that the Morrison Court's conclusion was
completely absurd, and we think that history (not to mention an 8-1 majority in Edmond)
has vindicated our and Justice Scalia's position.
24. This portion of our analysis develops ideas that we briefly foreshadowed fifteen
years ago. See Steven G. Calabresi & Gary Lawson, Equity and Hierarchy: Reflections on
the Harris Execution, 102 Yale L.J. 255, 273-75 (1992).
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As David Engdahl has convincingly demonstrated, the Exceptions Clause
is not a grant of power to Congress at all but is instead a reference to
power that is granted by the so-called Necessary and Proper Clause 2 5-or,
as the founding generation called it, the Sweeping Clause. 2 6 That power,
in turn, does not authorize Congress to deprive the Supreme Court of
jurisdiction over constitutionally granted subject matter. Rather, the "Exceptions" referenced in the Exceptions Clause are instances where Congress has made an "Exception[ ]" to the Supreme Court's appellatejurisdiction by instead granting it originaljurisdiction.

In other words, the

Sweeping Clause and Article III permit Congress to move cases back and
forth between the Supreme Court's original and appellate jurisdiction
but not to remove cases from that jurisdiction altogether. 27
This latter conclusion, of course, flies in the face of Marbury v.

Madison's holding that the Constitution's grants of originaljurisdiction to
the Supreme Court are exclusive. 28 Accordingly, in Part III we show that
Marbury was wrong on this point.29 We further argue that neither precedent nor practice trumps the original meaning of the constitutional text
with regard to jurisdiction stripping.
As it happens, the Detainee Treatment Act at issue in Hamdan might
not violate correct constitutional understandings of Congress's power to
structure the federal courts, though a full resolution of this question in-

volves issues beyond the scope of this Essay. While the statute takes away
habeas jurisdiction, 30 the statute specifically grants to the D.C. Circuit
power to review the government's determination of the status of detainees.1 and also "any final decision rendered"3 2 by a Guantanamo military
commission, including:

(i) whether the final decision was consistent with the standards
and procedures specified in the military order .

.

. ; and (ii) to

25. See David E. Engdahl, Intrinsic Limits of Congress' Power Regarding the Judicial
Branch, 1999 BYU L. Rev. 75, 119-32 [hereinafter Engdahl, Intrinsic Limits].
26. See, e.g., The Federalist No. 33, at 203 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 1961) (referring to "the sweeping clause, as it has been affectedly called").
27. Professor Claus has reached the same conclusion by focusing on the drafting,
ratification, and early judicial history of Article III, and we view his arguments as strongly
complementary to our textual and structural analysis. See Claus, supra note 20. The idea
that Article III specifies a constitutional minimum for the Supreme Court's original
jurisdiction, to which Congress can add by shifting cases from appellate to original
jurisdiction, has been part of the Article III dialogue since William Van Alstyne's classic
discussion in 1969, see William W. Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Marbury v. Madison,
1969 Duke L.J. 1, 31-33, but for reasons that we do not fully understand, the idea has not
thus far gained much traction in the academic community.
28. See 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 173-75 (1803).
29. We accordingly disavow our earlier reliance on this aspect of Marbury as
precedent. See Calabresi & Lawson, supra note 24, at 272.
30. Pub. L. No. 109-148, § 1005(e)(1), 119 Stat. 2739, 2742 (2005) (to be codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e)(1)).
31. Id. § 1005(e)(2), 119 Stat. at 2742 (to be codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241(e)(2)).
32. Id. § 1005(e) (3) (A), 119 Stat. at 2743.
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the extent the Constitution and laws of the United States are
applicable, whether the use of such standards and procedures to
reach the final decision is consistent with the Constitution and

laws of the United States.33
The statute does not purport to take away the Supreme Court's general power to review D.C. Circuit decisions by certiorari, 34 so the
Supreme Court has the final judicial say as to the legality of actions of the
Guantanamo military commissions. Congress has substituted one judicial
remedy, with the Supreme Court at the end of the trail, for another. One

can, we suppose, argue as an original matter that a suspension of habeas
corpus under the Constitution can occur even when a substitute remedy
is provided. 35 Alternatively, one could argue that the delay in review occa-

sioned by the substitution of post-decision review for habeas review3 6 is
itself a constitutional violation. 3 7 Thus, while the Detainee Treatment

Act does not present an unalloyed example of jurisdiction stripping, it
may slide into that category through the back door. If it does, it may well
be unconstitutional if the writ of habeas corpus must be universally available to all persons-another question on which we express no view. 38
Our analysis in this Essay is shaped by the principles of objectivemeaning textualism that we learned from clerking for Justice Scalia, and

for that reason we dedicate this Essay to him. One can disagree with giants even when standing on their shoulders.
33. Id. § 1005(e) (3) (D), 119 Stat. at 2743.
34. See 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) (2000).
35. Case law holds that there is no suspension of the writ when Congress instead
provides an alternative remedy. See, e.g., Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372, 381 (1977)
("[T]he substitution of a collateral remedy which is neither inadequate nor ineffective to
test the legality of a person's detention does not constitute a suspension of the writ of
habeas corpus."). We offer no opinion on whether this is a sound construction of the
Suspension Clause.
36. Under the Detainee Treatment Act, review is postponed until there has been a
determination by a military commission. See § 1005(e)(3) (A), 119 Stat. at 2743. Justice
Scalia was unmoved by this concern. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2819 n.7
(2006) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[I]t is unclear . . . that delay would inflict any injury on
petitioner, who ... is already subject to indefinite detention under our decision in Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld.").
37. Could Congress, for instance, impose a thirty day waiting period on the
effectiveness of any presidential pardon to give the President a chance to reconsider? Such
a statute would not disable the pardon power but would merely delay its effect. We are
quite confident that such a statute is unconstitutional. Whether there is a material
difference between such a statute and a statute delaying the exercise of jurisdiction
constitutionally vested in the Supreme Court is not obvious.
38. Professor Calabresi is of the view that the writ of habeas corpus must be universally
available to all persons resident in the domestic United States but not to aliens held
outside the United States. Accord Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 464 F. Supp. 2d 9 (D.D.C. 2006).
Whether the U.S. military base at Guantanamo is within the United States for these
purposes is a question beyond the scope of this Essay. See Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d
981 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (holding that Guantanamo Bay is within sovereignty of Cuba rather
than United States and that right to habeas corpus extends only to American sovereign
territory).
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I. CONGRESS AND JUDICIAL STRUCTURE
A. Some Structural Basics

The Constitution directly creates very few of the federal institutions
that govern everyday life. It creates, and provides detailed rules for the
selection and removal of members of the House 39 and the Senate, 40 the
President, and the Vice President. 41 Although the Constitution assumes

that there will be officers of the House and Senate,42 heads of executive
departments 4 3 (specifically including a Treasury department),4" "Ambas-

sadors [and] other public Ministers and Consuls," 45 and various other
"Officers of the United States,"" 6 it does not itself create any of these
legislative or executive offices. Rather, it is left to Congress to create (or
not to create) these institutions pursuant to its power to "make all Laws

which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof."47
If Congress created no executive departments or officers, it would be
foolish beyond measure, but (with one possible exception) it would not
be strictly unconstitutional.48
What about the federal courts? The Article III Vesting Clause pro-

vides that "[t]he judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in
one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may
from time to time ordain and establish." 49 This clause constitutionally
creates the Supreme Court, in the same way that the Article I Vesting
Clause creates Congress, the Article II Vesting Clause creates the President, and Article II, Section 1, Clause 3 creates the Vice President. The
existence of "inferior Courts" is conditional on congressional action, but

the existence of the Supreme Court is not. Nothing in Article III, of
course, spells out the size or other details of the Supreme Court (although the Impeachment Clause indicates that there must be a Chief
39. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 1; id. art. I, § 2, cls. 2-4; id. art. I, § 4, cl. 1; id. art. I, § 5,
cl. 1; id. art. I, § 6, cl. 2.
40. See id. art. I, § 3, cls. 1-3; id. art. I, § 4, cl. 1; id. art. I, § 5, cl. 1; id. art. I, § 6, cl. 2;
id. amend. XVII.
41. See id. art. II, § 1; id. amends. XII, XX, XXII-XXIII, XXV.
42. See id. art. I, § 2, cl. 5; id. art. I, § 3, cl. 5.
43. See id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
44. See id. art. I, § 9, cl. 7.
45. Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
46. Id.
47. Id, art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
48. The possible exception involves the Treasury. The Constitution mandates that
the President and federal judges receive compensation. See id. art. II, § 1, cl. 7; id. art. III,
§ 1. It also provides that "[n]o Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in
Consequence of Appropriations made by Law." Id. art. I, § 9, cl. 7. In order for the
President and courts to receive their constitutionally mandated compensation, it therefore
seems necessary for Congress to create a treasury out of which those salaries can be paid.
49. Id. art. III, § 1.
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Justice to preside over presidential impeachment trials 50 ); those matters
are left to Congress under the Sweeping Clause. Thus, Article III is not
self-executing in the same sense as Articles I and 11.51 Congress and the

President, through the lawmaking and appointment power, must act in
order to make the Supreme Court a functioning reality. But they are
constitutionally obliged to act to bring a Supreme Court, with at least one
member styled the Chief Justice, into existence. 52
If the Article III Vesting Clause were the Constitution's only reference to federal courts, it could conceivably be read by inference to authorize Congress to create inferior federal courts. As it happens, however, Article I includes a prior and more specific authorization among the

primary powers delegated to Congress: It declares that Congress shall
have power "[t]o constitute Tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court." 53
Thus, when Article III speaks of "such inferior Courts as the Congress
may from time to time ordain and establish," it is referring to courts that
Congress can constitute pursuant to its specific-and textually priorArticle I power. The "inferior courts" language in Article III is a crossreference rather than a power grant.
These two provisions regarding inferior courts present several distinct textual puzzles. First, there is no specifically targeted constitutional
authorization for Congress to create executive officers inferior to the
President; the power to create executive officers is part of Congress's general power under the Sweeping Clause to implement all other federal
powers. So why does the Constitution contain a specific provision al-

lowing Congress to "constitute" tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court
but no such provision for inferior executive officers? Second, the
Constitution does not ever say precisely that Congress may "create" inferior federal courts. Rather, the Article I Tribunals Clause vests the power
to "constitute Tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court." The Article III
Vesting Clause then refers, not to tribunals that have been "constitute[d]," but instead to "such inferior Courts as the Congress may from
time to time ordain and establish." Is there some significance to this difference in language between the Tribunals Clause and the Article III

Vesting Clause? Third, the Tribunals Clause, as its name indicates, refers
to "Tribunals," while Article III speaks of "Courts." Do these terms describe different legal entities?

50. See id. art. I, § 3, cl. 6.
51. See Engdahl, Intrinsic Limits, supra note 25, at 81-82 (comparing Article III to
Articles I and II and concluding that Article III "cannot be considered 'self-executing'").
52. In one arcane sense, Articles I and II are no more self-executing than is Article III.
A Congress and President exist only if people elect them. If an election was held and
nobody came, no one would be authorized to act as Congress or the President.
53. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 9. Congress's power to specify the size and term of the
Supreme Court, in contrast, flows from the Sweeping Clause which also grants Congress
some power over the Supreme Court's original and appellate jurisdiction as we explain
below. See infra Part II.
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We will shortly offer some answers to these puzzles, 5 4 but first we
must briefly look at the power vested by the Constitution in the federal
judiciary. Both of us have extensively argued in prior scholarship that the
Vesting Clauses of Articles II and III, unlike the Vesting Clause of Article
I, are best read as grants of power to the President and the federal courts,
respectively. 55 We will not rehearse those lengthy arguments here,
though they form an essential predicate to everything else that we argue

in this Essay. Indeed, the only power directly granted to the federal
courts by the Constitution is the 'judicial Power" granted by the Article

III Vesting Clause. Other clauses give the ChiefJustice power to preside
over presidential impeachment trials 56 and authorize the "Courts of Law"
to receive from Congress statutory power to appoint inferior officers, 57
but no other clauses of the Constitution give power directly to the federal
courts as an institution. Thus, the only power constitutionally vested in

federal courts is the judicial power to decide cases in accordance with
governing law, 58 along with any powers (such as the power to identify and
interpret governing law) that are incidental to that primary power. 59 Sec54. See infra Part I.C.
55. See Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 17, at 570-71; Calabresi & Rhodes, supra
note 19, at 1175-79; Calabresi, Vesting, supra note 19, at 1389-400; Lawson & Seidman,
Treaty Clause, supra note 19, at 22-43. The relevant definition from Samuel Johnson's
Dictionary of the English Language defines "vest" as meaning: "3. To make possessor of; to
invest with." SamuelJohnson, A Dictionary of the English Language (photo. reprint 1990)
(1755). The examples given in the dictionary are: "'To settle men's consciences, 'tis
necessary that they know the person, who by right is vested with power over them.' Locke.
'Had I been vested with the monarch's pow'r,-Thou must have sigh'd, unlucky youth! In
vain.' Prior." Id.
The word "vest" here comes from the Latin word "vestire" which means to clothe, as
with the robes of office. The official in question is clothed with "vestments" from the Latin
"vestis" which means garment or clothing. Thus the ceremony of empowering a judge or a
church official is called an "investiture" and is one where the judge's or church official's
robes of office are placed on him to symbolize his being clothed with the powers of his
office. See The Barnhart Dictionary of Etymology 1201 (Robert K. Barnhart ed., 1988).
56. U.S. Const. art. I, § 3, cl. 6.
57. Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. The Supreme Court has held that some administrative bodies
that are not constituted as Article III courts qualify as "Courts of Law" under this provision.
See Freytag v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 501 U.S. 868, 888-90 (1991). As Justice Scalia
demonstrated in his concurrence in Freytag, that holding is flatly wrong. See id. at 901-02,
909-11 (Scalia, J., concurring).
58. See Gary Lawson, Controlling Precedent: Congressional Regulation of Judicial
Decision-Making, 18 Const. Comment. 191, 202-03 (2001) [hereinafter Lawson,
Controlling Precedent]; Lawson & Moore, supra note 16, at 1273-74.
59. For thoughtful looks at what other incidental powers federal courts might have by
virtue of the grant of the judicial power, see Amy Coney Barrett, The Supervisory Power of
the Supreme Court, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 324, 353-66 (2006) (arguing that Constitution
does not grant Supreme Court supervisory power over inferior courts); James E. Pfander,
Jurisdiction-Stripping and the Supreme Court's Power to Supervise Inferior Tribunals, 78
Tex. L. Rev. 1433, 1500-11 (2000) [hereinafter Pfander, Jurisdiction-Stripping] (arguing
for supervisory powers of Supreme Court that may prevent Congress from jurisdiction
stripping); RobertJ. Pushaw,Jr., The Inherent Powers of Federal Courts and the Structural
Constitution, 86 Iowa L. Rev. 735, 843-66 (2001) (explaining powers of federal courts).
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tion 2 of Article III further specifies that this judicial power "shall ex-

tend"60 to nine categories of disputes: to "all cases" arising under federal
law or admiralty or involving ambassadors or similar officials and to "controversies" involving six combinations of parties. 6 1 Justice Story and Akhil

Amar have famously argued that Section 2 creates two "tiers" of federal
jurisdiction: The provisions that vest jurisdiction over "all cases" mean

that federal courts must have jurisdiction over the entirety of those classes
of disputes, while the provisions vesting jurisdiction over various "controversies," without the qualifier "all," permit but do not require federal jurisdiction over those disputes.62 We want to sidestep that argument here

and focus attention only on the categories of jurisdiction that explicitly
make reference to "all cases." If Professor Amar's two-tiered theory is incorrect, then our analysis of mandatory Supreme Court jurisdiction must
apply to diversity cases and all other cases within the compass of the fed-

eral judicial power.6 3
We can now see the constitutional effect of Article III on Congress's
power to control federal courts' jurisdiction. The Article II and Article
III Vesting Clauses both say that the powers they vest "shall" be vested in
the President and federal courts, respectively. As Professor Akhil Amar
and Justice Story have vigorously-and we think correctly-argued, 64 the

word "shall" as it appears in the Constitution, and elsewhere, normally
means "must" rather than "may." Thus, the plain meaning of the Vesting
Clause of Article III is that the judicial power of the United States "[must]
While it may seem odd to provide an account of Article III that explicates the crucial
phrase "judicial Power" in one simple sentence, we believe that the definition of judicial
power that we have offered is so basic that it would have been taken for granted by
reasonable eighteenth-century observers. On the dearth of direct discussions of the
meaning of "judicial Power" in the eighteenth century, see Lawson, Controlling Precedent,
supra note 58, at 202-03.
60. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
61. Id.
62. See Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 333-34 (1816); Akhil Reed
Amar, A Neo-Federalist View of Article III: Separating the Two Tiers of Federal
Jurisdiction, 65 B.U. L. Rev. 205, 240-46 (1985) [hereinafter Amar, Two Tiers].
63. For vigorous criticisms of the two-tiered theory, see Engdahl, Intrinsic Limits,
supra note 25, at 143-53; John Harrison, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction
of Federal Courts and the Text of Article III, 64 U. Chi. L. Rev. 203 (1997) [hereinafter
Harrison, Limit the Jurisdiction]; Martin H. Redish, Text, Structure, and Common Sense
in the Interpretation of Article III, 138 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1633 (1990). For defenses, see Akhil
Reed Amar, Reports of My Death Are Greatly Exaggerated: A Reply, 138 U. Pa. L. Rev.
1651 (1990); RobertJ. Pushaw, Jr., Congressional Power over Federal CourtJurisdiction: A
Defense of the Neo-Federalist Interpretation of Article III, 1997 BYU L. Rev. 847.
Professor Calabresi believes that it is settled by longstanding practice that Congress does
not need to give the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over all of the six combinations
of party-defined controversies. Whether the Supreme Court could assert such jurisdiction
relying on the non-statutory constitutional grant of power in Article III presents a different
question.
64. See Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) at 328-30; Amar, Two Tiers, supra note 62,
at 231-32, 239.
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be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish." The Vesting Clause
itself grants the judicial power. Section 2 of Article III then specifies that
this judicial power "shall extend" to "all cases" arising under federal law
or admiralty or involving ambassadors or similar officials, thus delineating and limiting (as is appropriate for a Constitution of limited and enumerated powers) the maximum potential extent of federal judicial power.
Section 2 of Article III then states that the Supreme Court "shall have"

original jurisdiction over certain cases and that "[i]n all the other Cases
before mentioned, the supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction,
both as to Law and Fact ... ." Within this class of disputes, the Supreme
Court must have either original or appellate jurisdiction.

Based on this

language (and we will get to the "Exceptions Clause" that is omitted by
the ellipsis soon enough), Article III creates a field of constitutionally

mandatory federal court jurisdiction.

The Supreme Court must have

power to decide all cases within these heads of jurisdiction. 65
Congress has no power to reduce this constitutionally granted juris-

diction. The Sweeping Clause does not provide any such power. First,
the Sweeping Clause only authorizes Congress to pass laws "for carrying
into Execution" other powers granted by the Constitution. A law taking
away jurisdiction that is granted by the Constitution does not "carry[ ]
into Execution" the judicial power; it prevents that power from being executed. For the same reasons, Congress cannot use the Sweeping Clause
to prohibit the President from exercising prosecutorial discretion over a

particular class of offenses. Such a law does not help "carry[ ] into Execution" the executive power vested in the President but instead prevents

that power from being exercised. 66 Second, any law passed by Congress
under the Sweeping Clause must be "necessary and proper for carrying into

Execution" federal powers. As one of us has argued to tedium, a "necessary and proper" law must be consistent with the structural principles embodied in the Constitution. 67 If Article III truly makes a field of federal
jurisdiction mandatory, it would take a grant of power far more pointed
than the Sweeping Clause to allow Congress to undo that result.

&

65. We recognize that by summarily endorsing a mandatory view of federal
jurisdiction, we are glossing over one of the most hotly contested issues in all of American
constitutional law. But there is only so much that we can do in an essay, and we see no
escape from the clear import of the mandatory language that infuses both Article II and
Article III.
66. For a similar argument, see Engdahl, Intrinsic Limits, supra note 25, at 102-03
(arguing that while Congress may pass laws to help effectuate executive power, Sweeping
Clause prevents Congress from passing laws that inhibit executive power).
67. See, e.g., Gary Lawson, Discretion as Delegation: The "Proper" Understanding of
the Nondelegation Doctrine, 73 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 235, 256-64 (2005) [hereinafter
Lawson, Discretion] (construing Sweeping Clause as having jurisdictional meaning that
constrains Congress's "choice of means to execute federal powers"); Gary Lawson
Patricia B. Granger, The "Proper" Scope of Federal Power: AJurisdictional Interpretation
of the Sweeping Clause, 43 Duke L.J. 267, 297-326 (1993) (similar).
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The only question is which federal courts must exercise this constitutionally granted judicial power. The Article III Vesting Clause, we have

seen, makes reference both to the Supreme Court and to "such inferior
Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish." Section 2 of Article III at least presumptively gives the Supreme Court either

original or appellate jurisdiction over all cases within the scope of the
federal judicial power, and Article I expressly gives Congress power "[t]o
constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court." In order to know
how federal judicial power must be divided between the supreme and
inferior courts, one must learn what it means for a tribunal to be "inferior
to the Supreme Court." And that proves to be no simple task.
B. A Complex Inferiority
There is a robust and growing body of scholarship concerning the
constitutional relationship between the "inferior" and "supreme" federal
courts. 68 For our purposes, one of the most important contributions was
made by David Engdahl, who has argued at great length that, at the time
of the founding, the words "inferior" and "supreme" as applied to judicial
tribunals did not necessarily carry any connotations of hierarchy of authority.6 9 Rather, he argues, the terms often simply described the
breadth of a tribunal's jurisdiction, geographic scope, or some other status, but did not mandate that a "supreme" court be able to review the
judgments of a so-called "inferior" court. 70 This explains how an early
draft of Article III could, without raising a hue and cry, propose "one or
more supreme tribunals," 7 1 ajudicial structure that was common in many
of the states in the late eighteenth century. 72 The notion of an "inferior"
court having the final judicial say on some matters also made excellent
practical sense in the founding era. If all federal cases could ultimately
be brought to a single, distant Supreme Court, then every litigant would
68. Without intending to slight anyone, see, e.g., Barrett, supra note 59; Ashutosh
Bhagwat, Separate but Equal?: The Supreme Court, the Lower Federal Courts, and the
Nature of the "Judicial Power," 80 B.U. L. Rev. 967 (2000); Evan Caminker, Allocating the
Judicial Power in a "Unified Judiciary," 78 Tex. L. Rev. 1513 (2000) [hereinafter Caminker,
Unified Judiciary]; David E. Engdahl, What's in a Name? The Constitutionality of Multiple
"Supreme" Courts, 66 Ind. L.J. 457 (1991) [hereinafter Engdahl, What's in a Name?];
Pfander, Judicial Power, supra note 20; Pfander, Jurisdiction-Stripping, supra note 59.
69. See Engdahl, What's in a Name?, supra note 68, at 473 (noting Founders'
discussion of "inferior" courts as having final jurisdiction in many instances). A number of
prominent scholars agree with Professor Engdahl's conclusions. See, e.g., Bhagwat, supra
note 68, at 983-94 (noting ambiguity of "inferior" as discussed in several cases); Edward A.
Hartnett, Not the King's Bench, 20 Const. Comment. 283, 292-93 (2003) (explaining
original meaning of "inferior" as simply not "highest court" rather than as establishing
hierarchical structure).
70. See Engdahl, What's in a Name?, supra note 68, at 466-72.
71. 1 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, at 21 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed.
1966).
72. See Engdahl, What's in a Name?, supra note 68, at 468-72. It also explains why
some state trial courts are labeled "supreme" courts.
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potentially face. the burden of lengthy travel-in an era when such travel

was perilous, expensive, and time-consuming. One might therefore expect the Constitution to permit local federal courts to be the forums of
last resort for at least some federal issues, reserving the Supreme Court
for matters of great import or high stakes. Professor Clinton's classic
study of Article III demonstrates that there was a widespread expectation

among prominent founding-era figures that Congress would have broad
authority to allocate the federal judiciary's constitutionally vested jurisdiction in precisely this fashion between the Supreme Court and lower federal courts. 73 Based both on the Constitution's legislative history and on
the likely practical consequences of alternative constructions, the best

reading of the terms "supreme" and "inferior" in Article III and the
Tribunals Clause would seem to have nothing to do with decisional hierarchy and would permit Congress to vest final federaljurisdiction in some
class of inferior courts.

Although some details of Professor Engdahl's historical arguments
have been criticized, 74 we find his case, along with Professor Clinton's
survey of the drafting and ratification history of Article III, very impressive, and we are prepared to stipulate that these arguments likely should
be decisive for those who regard legislative history and/or consequentialist arguments as the primary tools of constitutional interpretation. 75 For
formalists who look first and foremost to text and structure, however, a

very different picture emerges. 76
1. Inferiority and Constitutional Text. - As a matter of pure linguistic
usage, while the terms "supreme" and "inferior" can potentially bear either a hierarchical meaning or the kind of scope-based meaning proposed by Professor Engdahl and others, 77 the standard, and therefore
presumptive, meanings of those terms describe a hierarchical relationship. Samuel Johnson's eighteenth century Dictionary of the English
Language defined "supreme" as "1. Highest in dignity, highest in author-

73. See Robert N. Clinton, A Mandatory View of Federal CourtJurisdiction: A Guided
Quest for the Original Understanding of Article III, 132 U. Pa. L. Rev. 741 (1984).
74. See Barrett, supra note 59, at 349; Pfander, Jurisdiction-Stripping, supra note 59,
at 1448-49 (disagreeing with assertion that founding era English courts had no court
whose judgment was inherently final).
75. Professor Laurence Claus has recently challenged this orthodox account of the
legislative history of Article III. See Claus, supra note 20. If he is right, we may be
conceding too much here, but given our interpretive approach, we leave that question to
other worthy hands.
76. It is noteworthy here that the formal text of Article III has shaped constitutional
practice more than did the legislative history that Professor Engdahl finds so dispositive.
This is why for more than 130 years since 1875, Congress has provided for general federal
question jurisdiction in important cases. Enacted constitutional texts are likely to shape
subsequent practice more than do less widely known legislative histories which may help
explain why texts as diverse as the Equal Protection Clause and the Establishment Clause
often have a transformative dimension.
77. See Barrett, supra note 59, at 344-53; Bhagwat, supra note 68, at 983-84.
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ity. 2. Highest, most excellent" 78 and defined "inferiour"as "1. Lower in
place. 2. Lower in station or rank of life. 3. Lower in value or excel-

lence. 4. Subordinate."79 These usages, which reek of hierarchy, are
consistent with the Latin roots "supremus" and "inferus." The former
means "highest . .. above . . . OVER," 80 while the latter means "below or
beneath."8 1 The educated members of the founding generation were
well versed in Latin, so one can assume that the hierarchical meaning
would have been foremost in the mind of any reasonable reader of the

Federal Constitution.
The ultimate interpretative question, however, is always how words
are best understood in the specific context in which they are found. For pre-

sent purposes, the question is which understanding of the term "inferior"
best fits the specific contexts in which that term appears in Articles I and
III of the Federal Constitution. For an objective-meaning originalist, the
best place to start-with dictionaries and general linguistic usage playing
a supporting role-is with evidence of usage drawn from elsewhere in the
Constitution itself. 8 2
2. Inferiority and Constitutional Structure. - The term "inferior" appears in the Constitution in only one other place besides the references
to inferior courts or tribunals. The Appointments Clause generally requires federal officers to be appointed by the President by and with the
advice and consent of the Senate, but it states that "the Congress may by
Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in
the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments."8 3 What makes a federal officer "inferior" for this purpose?
In Morrison v. Olson, the Supreme Court applied a vague balancing
test8 4 to reach the peculiar conclusion that special prosecutors who cannot be removed at will and who receive some powers not possessed by the
Attorney General of the United States 85 are "inferior" officers who could
be appointed by courts of law. Justice Scalia subjected the Morrison test to
withering criticism in his dissent in that case. For Justice Scalia, the key
fact was that the special prosecutor was not subject to complete direction
78. Johnson, supra note 55.
79. Id.
80. The Barnhart Dictionary of Etymology, supra note 55, at 1095.
81. Id. at 525.
82. See Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 Harv. L. Rev. 748, 791-92 (1999)
(suggesting that Constitution itself may be better place to look than dictionaries when
attempting to define constitutional words or phrases).
83. U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (emphasis added).
84. See 487 U.S. 654, 670-73 (1988). The Court considered whether the officer "is
subject to removal by a higher Executive branch official," whether the officer can "perform
only certain, limited duties," whether the office "is limited in jurisdiction," and whether the
office "is limited in tenure." Id. Of course, every single federal executive official other
than the President and Vice President, including the Secretary of State and the Attorney
General, is potentially "inferior" under this test.
85. See id. at 716-17 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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or control by the President (or anyone else) in the exercise of his or her
prosecutorial functions. The special prosecutor did not answer to anyone

and therefore had no effective superior. According to Justice Scalia, "it is
not a sufficient condition for 'inferior' officer status that one be
subordinate to a principal officer .

.

. [b]ut it is surely a necessary condi-

tion for inferior officer status that the officer be subordinate to another
officer."8 6

Nine years later, Justice Scalia authored the majority opinion in
Edmond v. United States, which refined the Morrison inquiry to accord
more with Justice Scalia's position. 87 Writing for eight members of the
Court, Justice Scalia said:
Generally speaking, the term "inferior officer" connotes a rela-

tionship with some higher ranking officer or officers below the
President: Whether one is an "inferior" officer depends on
whether he has a superior. It is not enough that other officers
may be identified who formally maintain a higher rank, or possess responsibilities of a greater magnitude. If that were the intention, the Constitution might have used the phrase "lesser officer." Rather, in the context of a Clause designed to preserve
political accountability relative to important Government assignments, we think it evident that "inferior officers" are officers

whose work is directed and supervised at some level by others
who were appointed by Presidential nomination with the advice

and consent of the Senate. 8 8

Edmond effectively overruled Morrison sub silentio on the appropriate
standard for evaluating inferior officer status,8 9 and Edmond was right.

Admittedly, it is not immediately obvious that the word "inferior" in
the Appointments Clause must mean a hierarchical relationship. After
all, one could easily imagine calling an officer "inferior" because his or
her sphere of authority, tenure of office, or scope of duties was less robust
than that of other officers. Amy Coney Barrett, in an important recent
treatment of the inferior/supreme relationship in the Constitution, accordingly concludes (while expressing sympathy for Justice Scalia's posi-

tion) that the Appointments Clause is too ambiguous to shed significant
light on the meaning of "inferior" and "supreme" in Articles I and 111.90
We respectfully disagree. The structure of the Appointments Clause
provides good grounds for reading the term "inferior Officers" as Justice
Scalia read it in Edmond. The permissible recipients of power to appoint

"inferior Officers" are the President alone, the "Courts of Law," and the
"Heads of Departments." The President is obviously not an inferior officer since he is by definition the highest officer in the land. Moreover,
86.
87.
88.
89.
overrule
90.

Id. at 722.
520 U.S. 651 (1997).
Id. at 662-63.
But see Barrett, supra note 59, at 352 n.118 (noting that Edmond expressly did not
Morrison and maintaining that Morrison may still be valid case law).
See id. at 352-53.
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the clear import of this provision is that the "Courts of Law" and "Heads

of Departments" who can receive appointment power are also not themselves inferior officers. There is, we suppose, nothing logically impossible
about having inferior officers appoint other inferior officers, but the fact
that the Appointments Clause singles out two classes of officers (other
than the President) as permissible appointing authorities certainly suggests that these officers stand apart from the people who they are appointing and thus do not themselves fall into the class of inferior officers

who may be appointed without Senate confirmation.
This conclusion is linguistically unassailable with respect to the
"Heads of Departments." The relevant definition of "head" in Samuel
Johnson's Dictionary of the English Language is "Chief; principal person;

one to whom the rest are subordinate; leader; commander." 91 There is
simply no way that the "Head" of a department within the meaning of
Article II can be understood to be an inferior officer. It is less obvious
textually that "Courts of Law" must of necessity be principal officers, but
the conjunction of "Courts of Law" with the indisputably principal "President" and with the "Heads of Departments," and the separation of all
three classes of officers from the "inferior Officers" who they are empowered to appoint, seals the deal.
A "Department[ ]," in turn, is any unit of government that has suffi-

cient distinctness and authority to be viewed as a "Department[ ]."9

As

Justice Scalia wrote in his concurring opinion in Freytag v. Commissionerof
Internal Revenue:
As an American dictionary roughly contemporaneous with
adoption of the Appointments Clause provided, and as remains
the case, a department is "[a] separate allotment or part of business; a distinct province, in which a class of duties are allotted to
a particular person...." 1 N. Webster, American Dictionary 58
(1828) . . . . [T]he Founders . . . chose the word
"Departmen[t]," .. . not to connote size or function (much less

Cabinet status), but separate organization-a connotation that
still endures even in colloquial usage today ("that is not my

department").93
91. Johnson, supra note 55.
92. To those who find this kind of circularity in a definition unserious or unlikely:
Many of the Constitution's most important structural provisions involve such circularity.
The proper formulation of the nondelegation doctrine is similarly circular. See Wayman v.
Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 43 (1825) (distinguishing "those important subjects,
which must be entirely regulated by the legislature itself, from those of less interest, in
which a general provision may be made, and power given to those who are to act under
such general provisions to fill up the details"); Gary Lawson, Delegation and Original
Meaning, 88 Va. L. Rev. 327, 376-78 (2002) (defending this formulation at length).
Within the Appointments Clause itself, the critical term "Officers" is undefined, but it
pretty clearly means anyone who is important enough to be an officer. See Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 126 (1976) (defining, correctly we think, an "officer" as "any appointee
exercising significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United States").
93. 501 U.S. 868, 920 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) (first omission in original).
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Samuel Johnson's Dictionary of the English Language almost precisely

tracks Webster's Dictionary (or, rather, vice versa given the temporal sequence), defining "department" as "Separate allotment; province or business assigned to a particular person."9 4 Given these meanings, there is no
way that inferior officer status can be determined by extent of authority
rather than by hierarchy. Nothing in the Constitution determines how
extensive the powers and responsibilities of any "Departments," and
therefore any "Heads of Departments," must be. The structure and func-

tions of executive departments are determined by Congress pursuant to
the Sweeping Clause, and if Congress wants to create a Department of
Banality, complete with a Secretary of Ineffectiveness with relatively little

actual authority, 95 that is within the purview of Congress. From a constitutional standpoint, the person at the top of the Department of Banality
is the head of a department-and therefore a principal officer under the
Appointments Clause.

The text and structure of the Appointments Clause thus forecloses
the idea that one can determine inferior officer status without reference

to hierarchy. An officer can be answerable to someone else and yet still
be a principal officer because of the importance of the scope of the du-

ties, but an officer who does not answer to anyone other than the President96 is necessarily a principal officer because he or she will be the head
of a department.
Against this reading, one might object that the only officers mentioned by title in the Appointments Clause are "Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, [and] Judges of the supreme Court." There is
no specific mention in the first portion of the Appointments Clause of
94. Johnson, supra note 55. The obvious objection to this understanding of a
"Department[ ]" is that Justice Scalia wrote for only four Justices, while a majority of the
Court in Freytag adopted a quite different view of what counts as a constitutional
"Department[ ]." The Freytag majority stated that "[c]onfining the term 'Heads of
Departments' in the Appointments Clause to executive divisions like the Cabinet-level
departments constrains the distribution of the appointment power." Freytag, 501 U.S. at
886. That may be true, but it is unclear (1) what it means to be "like the Cabinet-level
departments"; (2) why that is a plausible construction of the Appointments Clause given
that the Cabinet is an informal construct rather than a constitutionally created institution;
and (3) why the modern Supreme Court's view of what best constrains the distribution of
power is a better guide to original meaning than a consensus of founding-era dictionaries.
Our focus in this Essay is on original meaning rather than current doctrine, and on that
score Samuel Johnson and Noah Webster are likely to be more reliable than Harry
Blackmun.
95. There are limits to how little authority an official can have while still ranking
among the "Heads of Departments." In order to be a principal officer, one must first be an
officer, and someone with no or minimal authority to execute the laws of the United States
simply is not an "Officer of the United States." See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 126 (noting
requirement of "significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United States").
96. All executive officers, whether principal or inferior, necessarily are subordinate to
the President, in whom the totality of the "executive Power" is vested. The principal/
inferior relationship described in the Appointments Clause refers to the relationship
among those officers created by congressional statute.
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either "Courts of Law" other than Supreme Court Justices or "Heads of

Departments," so why assume that people in these positions must be principal officers?

But this objection misunderstands the Appointments

Clause. 9 7 The Appointments Clause does not say that all of the specifically named officers must be appointed by the President with the advice
and consent of the Senate, no matter what. The Appointments Clause
does not in any way distinguish the named officers from "all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise

provided for." 98 The important distinction in the Appointments Clause is
not between officers who are named and those who are not, but between
officers who are "inferior"-whether named or not-and those who are
not inferior. If certain "public Ministers and Consuls" are in fact "inferior
Officers," then Congress can vest their appointment in the President
without Senate confirmation, and if some of the "other Officers of the
United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided
for," are not inferior, then they must be appointed by the President with
the advice and consent of the Senate. And if any officers are among the
"Courts of Law" or "Heads of Departments," they are principal officers

who may receive power to appoint inferior officers.
In sum, the best understanding of the word "inferior" in the Appointments Clause is that an inferior officer must be subordinate to some
other executive officer besides the President (to whom everyone in the
executive department is subordinate). An officer who is not supervised
or directed by some other executive officer is, of necessity, a principal
officer. On this point, Justice Scalia was entirely correct.
It is possible that Article I and Article III use the term "inferior" in a
wholly different sense than does the Appointments Clause of Article II.
But there is no good reason to suspect that this is true. There were plenty
of terms that the Constitution could have used to describe the relationships between various executive officers and between the Supreme Court
and other federal courts. In each case, however, the Constitution uses
the word "inferior," so a good starting point for analysis is that the words
have the same meaning. Because an "inferior Officer" must be
subordinate to some other executive official, it is reasonable to assume
that an "inferior Court," or a "Tribunal[ ] inferior to the supreme Court,"
must be subordinate to some other court. It is also striking in this regard
that the Tribunals Clause uses the term "inferior to the Supreme Court"
whereas the Appointments Clause of Article II does not specify that inferior executive officers are inferior to principal executive officers. This

97. We have previously acknowledged our debt to Lee Liberman Otis for bringing this
point to our attention. See Calabresi & Lawson, supra note 24, at 275 n.103.
98. Who are these officers whose appointments are "otherwise provided for"? The list
is short but important: the Vice President, see U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 3; id. amend. XII;
the officers of the House and Senate, see id. art. I, § 2, cl. 5; id. art. I, § 3, cl. 5; and the
officers of the militia, see id. art. I, § 8, cl. 16.
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wording reinforces the notion of hierarchy which we have shown is already implicit from the use of the word "inferior."
This conclusion is confirmed-we think decisively-by the other appearance in the Constitution of the word "supreme." The Supremacy

Clause of Article VI provides that:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall
be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which
shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be
the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall
be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any

State to the Contrary notwithstanding. 99
In this provision, the word "supreme" unambiguously denotes a hierarchical relationship: In any conflict-of-laws encounter between federal
law and state law, federal law is hierarchically superior.' 00 By choosing to
describe the constitutionally created federal court as a "supreme Court,"
the Tribunals Clause and the Article III Vesting Clause invite an intratex-

tual comparison to the Supremacy Clause, which strongly pushes in favor
of a hierarchical understanding of "supreme."
For objective-meaning originalists like ourselves and Justice Scalia,
the intratextual and structural arguments in favor of executive and judicial hierarchy are compelling confirmation of the original public mean-

ing exhibited in the dictionaries we quoted. When the Constitution refers to tribunals "inferior to the supreme Court," it is describing tribunals
that are effectively subordinateto the Supreme Court in some hierarchical

fashion. The remaining question is the character of the subordination.
3. Inferiority and Constitutional Context. - Inferior executive officers
must be subject to the decisional supervision and control of principal officers and, ultimately, the President. Indeed, the President can personally veto any decision made by a subordinate executive official.' 0 1 By the

same token, inferior federal courts must be subject to the decisional supervision and control of the Supreme Court, which must be able to veto

99. Id. art. VI, cl. 2 (emphasis added).
100. Vasan Kesavan has argued that there is also an internal hierarchy within the
Supremacy Clause, with the Constitution trumping both statutes and treaties and statutes
in turn trumping treaties. See Vasan Kesavan, The Three Tiers of Federal Law, 100 Nw. U.
L. Rev. 1479, 1499-503 (2006). The first relationship is now settled law, and Kesavan
makes an intriguing originalist case for the second. See id. at 1514-612 (finding historical
support for three tiers interpretation).
101. Or so we maintain. See Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 17, at 595-96 (arguing
that since President exercises exclusive control over execution of all federal laws, he "must
be able to nullify an action taken by an inferior executive officer"); Gary Lawson, The Rise
and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 1231, 1243 (1994) [hereinafter
Lawson, Rise and Rise] ("[A]lthough the President cannot directly exercise power vested
by statute in another official, any action by that subordinate contrary to presidential
instructions is void."). A full defense of this position would require a separate article.

2007 ]

JURISDICTION STRIPPING AND HAMDAN

1023

(reverse) any decision made by a subordinate court.1 02 Otherwise, they
are not hierarchically inferior. The minimum content of the inferior/

supreme relationship established by the Tribunals Clause and confirmed
by the Article III Vesting Clause is that any exercise of authority by an
inferior federal court must be subject to ultimate review by the Supreme
Court. Accordingly, when the Constitution vests all judicial power over
all of a certain class of cases in the federal courts, it means that the last,
"supreme"judicial word over that class of cases must rest in the Supreme
Court. That is what it means for the Supreme Court to be constitutionally supreme.
The precise character of the superior/subordinate relationships laid
out in Articles II and III, however, can perhaps differ in important re-

spects because the "executive Power" and 'judicial Power" vested by those
clauses are not identical powers. For example, the President's "executive
Power" authorizes him or her to issue binding instructions to subordi-

nates, but whether the Supreme Court has analogous power to bind
inferior courts to follow its precedent or to prescribe rules for the administration of the inferior courts is a difficult question that we put aside
here. 10 The President by long tradition has considerable power to remove subordinates,1 04 while the Supreme Court has no power to remove
inferior judges. But these differences in power stem from the difference

between a (unitary) grant of "executive Power" and a (unitary) grant of
'judicial Power" rather than from anything pertaining to hierarchical inferiority. The power to review decisions of subordinates is essential to the

very concept of subordination and therefore to the very concept of inferiority written into the Constitution.
Consequently, we respectfully disagree with Akhil Amar (among
others), who argues vigorously for the parity of the supreme and inferior
courts under Article 111.105 Professor Amar thinks that the Supreme
Court can be stripped of the last word over federal questions as long as
102. See Pfander, judicial Power, supra note 20, at 649 ("The 'existence of a
hierarchical relationship among federal courts implies that lower courts must respect the
decisions of their judicial superiors as controlling authority.").
103. For some thoughts on vertical precedent, see Evan H. Caminker, Why Must
Inferior Courts Obey Superior Court Precedents?, 46 Stan. L. Rev. 817, 865-72 (1994)
(discussing varying justifications for mandatory adherence to vertical precedent). For a
careful analysis of the Court's so-called "supervisory" power, see generally Barrett, supra
note 59 (arguing that supervisory power is largely unsupported by constitutional text or
historical practice).
104. Steven G. Calabresi & Christopher S. Yoo, A History of the Unitary Executive:
Executive Branch Practice from 1789 to 2007 (forthcoming 2007). One of us has some
lingering doubts about the constitutional pedigree of this removal power, but will stifle
them for the moment. See Lawson, Rise and Rise, supra note 101, at 1244 & n.74 (arguing
that removal power is not supported by constitutional text and cannot be justified by
operational needs of executive branch).
105. See Amar, Two Tiers, supra note 62, at 230 (noting that Congress has "power to
shift final resolution of any cases within the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction to any
other Article III court that [it] may create").
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some inferior federal court is empowered to hear those cases.1 06 Thus,
Professor Amar would find unobjectionable a bill that stripped the
Supreme Court and all lower courts except the D.C. Circuit of the power
to hear appeals filed by Guantanamo detainees. In this situation, however, the D.C. Circuit would cease to be inferior to the Supreme Courtjust as special prosecutors such as Kenneth Starr and Lawrence Walsh
were not really inferior executive officers because they were not subject to
presidential direction, control, and revision.

This account of the relationship between the Supreme Court and
other federal courts is reinforced by the precise language of the Article
III Vesting Clause. The clause states that "[t]he judicial power of the
United States shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior
Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish."1 0 7
As a consequence, every quantum of federal judicial power is vested in
the Supreme Court even if it is also vested in an inferior court as well. If
the object was to allow lower federal courts to wield judicial power independently of the Supreme Court, the clause would have had to vest the
judicial power in the Supreme Court or such inferior courts as Congress
might ordain and establish.1 08 By vesting the power in the conjunctive

rather than the disjunctive, the effect is to vest the Supreme Court with
all of the federal judicial power 109 -just as the Article II Vesting Clause
vests the President with all of the federal executive power. Subordinate
executive officers, of course, are capable of exercising executive power
(the President need not personally conduct all criminal investigations

and prosecutions, for example), but that exercise of power must ulti106. For a recent restatement of Professor Amar's now-classic position, see Akhil Reed
Amar, America's Constitution: A Biography 226 (2005) [hereinafter Amar, America's
Constitution]. As a gratuitous aside concerning our mutual friend and former schoolmate:
Professor Amar's latest book may well be the best book on the American Constitution yet
written, and notwithstanding the brevity of this Essay, we never take disagreement with
Professor Amar lightly.
107. U.S. Const. art. III, § 1 (emphasis added).
108. To be sure, because the Article III Vesting Clause vests the "judicial Power" as an
undifferentiated whole, the precise effect of simple disjunctive language in Article III
would have been somewhat ambiguous, as it could have been taken to mean that (1) the
federal judicial power must vest either entirely in the Supreme Court or entirely in the
lower federal courts or (2) the federal judicial power could be divided in some fashion
between the supreme and inferior courts. Language that unambiguously vested a measure
of unreviewable power in lower federal courts would have had to be relatively complex.
But the effect of the actual conjunctive language that appears in Article III is plain. We are
grateful to David Shapiro for prompting our deeper consideration of this point.
109. The word "and" here has to be used in the conjunctive sense because otherwise
one cannot explain how the Constitution grants both the Supreme Court and the inferior
courts the judicial power to decide cases or controversies. Recall that there is no other
clause in Article III, other than the Vesting Clause, which can be read as conferring on
judges the power to act. Article III is in this respect different from Article II. Even if one
wrongly read the Article II Vesting Clause as not being a grant of power, as do many
scholars, one could still claim the President was granted powers by clauses in Sections 2
and 3 of Article II.
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mately be subject to presidential direction and control. Similarly, inferior
courts may exercise federal judicial power, but always subject to the control and supervision of the Supreme Court.1 10
C. Whither the States?

If Congress creates lower federal courts, they must be subject to the
control and supervision of the Supreme Court. But what if Congress does
not create any lower federal courts at all? May state courts then decide
federal cases free of Supreme Court supervision?
At this point we address the principal textual puzzles that we posed
near the beginning of this Part: (1) Why does the Constitution contain a
clause specifically authorizing Congress to constitute tribunals inferior to
the Supreme Court while leaving the creation of executive actors inferior
to the President to the Sweeping Clause? (2) Why does the Tribunals
Clause of Article I say that Congress may "constitute" tribunals inferior to
the Supreme Court while the Article III Vesting Clause references such
inferior courts as those that Congress may "ordain and establish"?"1 Our
answers have been anticipated and developed by James Pfander in an important-and we think superb-recent article." 2 We independently
reach conclusions very similar to Professor Pfander's through a different
line of reasoning. We think that our textual and intratextual arguments
are strongly complementary to Professor Pfander's textual, functional,
and historical arguments. Together, they form a very strong case for an
unconventional account of the relationship between the state courts and
the Supreme Court.

When state courts decide issues of federal law, they can do so for
several reasons. First, they might do so because they are courts of general
jurisdiction, and cases that come before them might raise federal issues.
Deciding an issue of federal law in that circumstance is no different in
principle than deciding an issue of Norwegian law when the case properly
presents it. The one difference between federal and Norwegian law is
that the Supremacy Clause mandates that in any conflict between applicable federal law and any other source of law, the federal law takes prece110. Professor Amar suggested in his first published work as an academic that the "in"
language in the Article III Vesting Clause was inserted solely for grammatical clarity and
has no substantive implications. See Amar, Two Tiers, supra note 62, at 231 n.88. That
may or may not have been the intentions of the drafters, but the language as it appears is
strongly consistent with our hierarchical reading of the clause. Evan Caminker has noted
(while rejecting on functional and historical grounds) the strength of the textual reading
that we endorse. See Caminker, Unified Judiciary, supra note 68, at 1536-39.
111. We will address the tribunals/courts distinction in due course as well, but the
first two textual puzzles are more closely integrated, so we deal with them first.
112. See James E. Pfander, Federal Supremacy, State-Court Inferiority, and the
Constitutionality of Jurisdiction-Stripping Legislation, 101 Nw. U. L. Rev. (forthcoming
2007) (manuscript at 10, on file with the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter Pfander,
Federal Supremacy] (concluding "certain forms of jurisdiction stripping violate the
constitutional requirements of supremacy and inferiority").
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dence. The Supremacy Clause thus provides a conflict of laws rule, but the
power to hear the case and decide thefederal issue stems from the court's inter-

nal authority as a state court.
State courts might also decide federal issues because Congress orders
them to do so. If Congress chooses to rely on state courts for much, or
even all, of the federal judicial business that is not constitutionally vested
in the Supreme Court directly, Congress may wish formally to designate
state courts as forums for hearing federal cases. If such a congressional
statute is constitutionally valid, the Supremacy Clause prevents state law
from overriding it and effectively forces the state courts to hear the cases.
In this latter case, if Congress passes such a statute, has it "ordain [ed] and
establish[ed]" the relevant state courts as inferior federal courts?
If the answer is yes, some startling consequences would follow. All of

the courts mentioned in Article III-the courts that may exercise the "judicial Power of the United States"-share certain properties: "The
Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices
during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office." 1 3 Thus, the "inferior Courts" which Congress may
"ordain and establish" have salary and tenure guarantees specified by the

federal Constitution. If state courts are "ordain[ed] and establish[ed]" as
federal courts, they too must have the constitutionally requisite salary and
tenure guarantees. The result is not unthinkable, but it does seem rather

peculiar.
We do not believe that any such thing happens. Here is where the
constitutional difference between constituting a tribunal and ordainingand
establishinga court comes into play. The intratextual argument here gets

a bit intricate, so we ask for patience. 1 4
As a matter of pure linguistic usage, one can "establish" a body such
as a court either by creating it from scratch or by designating an existing
body. Samuel Johnson's Dictionary contains definitions of "establish" that
could support either reading.' 5 Indeed, a similar dispute over the meaning of "establish" in another part of the Constitution consumed a great
deal of attention in the nation's first fifty years. The Constitution autho-

rizes Congress "[t]o establish Post Offices and post Roads."1

6

Many

founding era figures, including Thomas Jefferson and James Monroe,
staunchly maintained that this only gave Congress the power to designate
113. U.S. Const. art. III, § 1.
114. For linguistic and historical treatments of this question that complement our
analysis, see Pfander, Federal Supremacy, supra note 112 (manuscript at 11-20); Pfander,
Judicial Power, supra note 20, at 674-79.
115. Samuel Johnson defined "establish" (excluding several archaic usages) as: "1.
To settle firmly; to fix unalterably. 2. To settle in any privilege or possession; to confirm.
3. To make firm; to ratify. 4. To fix or settle in an opinion. 5. To form or model."
Johnson, supra note 55. The fifth definition conforms to the idea of creating a court,
while the first three seem more consistent with designating an existing body.
116. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 7.
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existing state roads as postal routes and did not include the power to con-

struct a new road. Others, including Joseph Story, strongly disagreed.
The issue divided the Supreme Court as late as 1845.117 The intratextual

evidence, however, strongly favors those who supported the congressional
power to create and construct new roads as well as the power to designate
existing roads. A mere three clauses before the Postal Roads Clause in
Article I, Section 8, the Constitution gives Congress power "[t]o establish
an uniform Rule of Naturalization, and uniform Laws on the subject of
Bankruptcies throughout the United States."" 8 This obviously grants the
power to create rules of naturalization and bankruptcy rather than merely

the power to designate preexisting rules as binding. There is no good reason to think that Article I, Section 8 uses the same term in two different
senses in such close proximity.
This means that the term "establish" as used in the Constitution can
mean either the creation or the designation of an institution; surely the

Postal Roads Clause at least permits Congress to designate existing state
roads as postal roads (and by the same token the Bankruptcy Clause
would surely permit Congress to pick an existing state bankruptcy law and
give it uniform nationwide effect). The same would presumptively be
true of the Article III Vesting Clause. Does Article III therefore refer either to courts created by Congress or to state courts designated by Congress as federal tribunals, with all of the startling consequences for the

tenure and salary of state court judges that we have described?
This might well be the case if Article III, paralleling the Bankruptcy
Clause and the Postal Roads Clause, referred simply to courts that Congress might "establish." But the Article III Vesting Clause uses a formulation subtly but importantly different from the uses of "establish" elsewhere in the Constitution: Article III speaks of inferior courts that
Congress may from time to time "ordainand establish." This formulation
is striking and significant.
As a matter of common usage, the word "ordain" would seem to
mean to confer a status upon something, or at most to replicate the word
"establish." Samuel Johnson's Dictionary is consistent with this intuition:

The word "ordain" is defined as "1. To appoint; to decree. 2. To establish, to settle; to institute. 3. To set in an office. 4. To invest with ministerial function, or sacerdotal power."" 9 So understood, there would be
little or no difference between the word "establish" and the phrase "or-

dain and establish."
The Constitution, however, uses the precise phrase "ordain and establish" in one other place, and in context the phrase has significant

&

117. For a short summary of the founding era debate over postal roads, see Lawson
Granger, supra note 67, at 267 n.3. For the longer version, see Lindsay Rogers, The Postal
Power of Congress: A Study in Constitutional Expansion 61-96 (Johns Hopkins Univ.
Stud. in Hist. & Pol. Sci. Vol. 34, No. 2, 1916).
118. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (emphasis added).
119. Johnson, supra note 55.
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meaning and effect that goes beyond its ordinary usage. The Preamble
declares that "We the People . .. do ordain and establish this Constitution
for the United States of America." 120 Since the Constitution obviously
was not a preexisting legal institution that could be designated as having
status in some fashion, the usage of the phrase in the Preamble clearly
refers to bringing something into existence that did not previously exist.
This is highlighted by comparison to and contrast with the ratification
provision in Article VII, which states that "[t]he Ratification of the Conventions of nine States, shall be sufficient for the Establishment of this
Constitution between the States so ratifying the Same."1 2 1 To "establish"
the Constitution through ratification is to "make firm; to ratify"1 2 2 a docu-

ment that already exists. By contrast, to "ordain and establish" the
Constitution must be to bring it into existence so that it may subsequently
be "establish[ed]," or given the designated status of supreme law,
through ratification. As the Constitution uses the terms, to "ordain and

establish" an institution is a markedly different act than to "establish" it:
The latter can mean either to create or to designate a status for, while the
former can only mean to create.12 3
Intratextually, then, when Article III refers to courts that Congress
has "ordain[ed] and establish[ed]," it refers most naturally to courts that
Congress has itself created-just as "We the People" created the

Constitution.1 24

Those congressionally created courts automatically

share in the Article III 'judicial Power" by virtue of the Article III Vesting

Clause, they possess tenure and salary guarantees, and because they are
"inferior" courts, they are subject to supervision and control by the
Supreme Court.
The Article I Tribunals Clause, by contrast, does not give Congress
power to "establish," or to "ordain and establish," tribunals inferior to the

Supreme Court. Instead, it grants power to "constitute" such tribunals.
The word "constitute" does not appear anywhere else in the Constitution,
120. U.S. Const. pmbl.
121. Id. art. VII (emphasis added).
122. Johnson, supra note 55. For a more complete review of Samuel Johnson's
definitions of "establish," see supra note 115.
123. Professor Pfander has recognized the relevance of the Preamble to the
construction of Article III, but he concludes that the term "ordain and establish" describes
a degree of permanence rather than, as we believe, a pure act of creation. See Pfander,
Judicial Power, supra note 20, at 674-75. But the linkage between the Preamble and
Article VII strongly supports our construction. Nor do either the inferior federal courts or
the Constitution itself necessarily have any particular degree of permanence. What
Congress or the People today ordain and establish they can tomorrow unordain and
disestablish.
124. Of course, as a matter of historical fact, the Constitution was not created by "We
the People" but instead by a small subset of people. For legal purposes, however, the
Constitution's pretension is more important than the historical facts-just as parties are
viewed in law as the creators of contracts, wills, leases, etc. that are actually drafted by other
people. For a more detailed discussion of the meaning of "ordain and establish" in the
Preamble, see Lawson & Seidman, Originalism, supra note 17, at 58-59.
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so we must turn to background usages to glean its meaning. Johnson's
Dictionary indicates that the word "constitute," like the word "establish,"
can readily support either the creation or the designation of an institution.
Johnson defines the term as "1. To give formal existence; to make any
thing what it is; to produce. . . . 2. To erect; to establish. . . . 3. To
depute; to appoint another to an office."125 In the context of a judicial
body in the Constitution of 1788, to designate an existing institution as a
"tribunal inferior to the supreme Court" most naturally means to designate an existing state court to be such an institution-which was precisely
the practice under the Articles of Confederation, with which the founding generation would therefore have had considerable familiarity. 126
Johnson's second and third definitions of "constitute" thus correspond
perfectly to the two distinct senses in which Congress might "constitute" a
tribunal inferior to the Supreme Court. The Tribunals Clause is most
naturally read to give Congress power both to create federal courts and to
designate existing state courts as "Tribunals inferior to the supreme

Court."1 2 7
When Congress exercises its power to constitute a state court as a
"Tribunal[ ] inferior to the supreme Court," it does not thereby vest that
state court with a portion of the federal judicial power. That power can
only be exercised by "one supreme Court, and ... such inferior Courts as
the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish," and to ordain
and establish a court is different from constituting one. The constitutional effect of a congressional designation of a state court as a "Tribunal[ ] inferior to the supreme Court," however, is to give the Supreme
Court hierarchicalauthority over that state tribunal. Even without any congressional designation, state courts are generally free to decide federal

issues that arise in the normal course of their jurisdiction. When acting
purely as state courts, however, they are not, from a federal constitutional
standpoint, "Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court" any more than
would be a court of Mexico or Denmark that happened to decide an issue
of federal law in the course of its duties. State courts, unlike foreign
courts, have a duty to give federal law precedence in any conflict-of-laws
situation, but there is nothing in the Supremacy Clause that subjects state
125. Johnson, supra note 55.
126. See Michael G. Collins, The Federal Courts, the First Congress, and the NonSettlement of 1789, 91 Va. L. Rev. 1515, 1525-26 (2005) [hereinafter Collins, NonSettlement]; Pfander, Judicial Power, supra note 20, at 679-80.
127. We are, at least for the present, agnostic about whether Congress can designate
state courts to hear all cases under the Constitution or whether some classes of cases must
be heard in the first instance in federal court. For a thoughtful presentation of the
evidence for the latter position, see Michael G. Collins, Article III Cases, State Court
Duties, and the Madisonian Compromise, 1995 Wis. L. Rev. 39, 43, 49-54; Collins, NonSettlement, supra note 126, at 1570-74. Professor Pfander maintains that the "Tribunals"
mentioned in the Tribunals Clause are such entities as territorial courts, courts martial,
and administrative adjudicative organs. See Pfander, Judicial Power, supra note 20, at
672-89. For our discussion of this theory, see infra text accompanying notes 137-149.
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courts to oversight by the Supreme Court. If Congress wishes to do so,
however, it may subordinate state court decisions to the Supreme Court
by exercising its power to "constitute" the state courts as "Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court." In this way, Congress can make the state

courts part of the federal judicial hierarchy without otherwise implicating
state courts in the issues surrounding Article III.
Recall, however, that the Article III Vesting Clause is a power grant
that is mandatory in nature. If Professor Amar and other advocates of
mandatory vesting are right about at least the first three heads ofjurisdiction in Article III, Section 2, then with respect to cases arising under
those heads, the Supreme Court must have the last judicial word. Congress must either create inferior federal courts to hear those cases under

the supervision of the Supreme Court or must constitute state courts as
"Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court." If Congress does neither, the

Constitution itself vests appellate jurisdiction over those cases in the
Supreme Court.12 8 All roads must end at the Supreme Court.
The idea that the Supreme Court has constitutionally-based jurisdiction to review state court cases that involve the first three heads of jurisdiction in Section 2 of Article III is striking enough to require some additional elaboration. The key is to determine exactly which cases are within
the Article III extension of federal judicial power to "all Cases" arising
under federal law or involving ambassadors or admiralty. When Article

III declares that the federal judicial power vested in the Supreme Court
shall extend to "all Cases" within the enumerated categories, it can mean
any of four different things, each of which has very different conse-

quences for the role of the Supreme Court in the constitutional scheme.
First, the reference to "all Cases" could literally mean "all Cases," in
whatever forum they are brought. This would be too absurd even for the

most arid of textualists (and we are as dry as they come). As we have
already noted, courts of foreign countries might have to decide issues of
American federal law in the course of their duties,just as American courts
must often decide issues of foreign law.

The American Constitution

could not, under any theory of constitutionalism that would occur to a
reasonable observer in 1788, authorize American courts to review decisions of foreign tribunals. The Constitution is the Constitution of the
United States, not the Constitution of North America, Western Christendom, or the world community.
Second, the reference in Article III to "all Cases" might simply mean
all cases brought in federal courts, specifically excluding any cases
brought in state court. This interpretation draws upon the background
rule of interpretation which holds that the Constitution refers only to the
federal government and federal institutions unless it directly says other128. If the Supreme Court's constitutionally specified original jurisdiction is a floor
rather than a ceiling, see infra Part II, then as a theoretical matter, perhaps the
constitutional command could also be satisfied by vesting original jurisdiction in all federal
cases in the Supreme Court.
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wise, 12 9 so that in the absence of a specific reference to state courts, Article III does not authorize review of state court judgments.

This, of

course, was precisely the argument advanced by the Virginia Supreme
Court in Martin v. Hunter's Lessee when it refused to recognize the author-

ity of the United States Supreme Court to review its judgments under
section 25 of the Judiciary Act of 1789.130 We will not rehearse here
Justice Story's famous rejection of this claim,13 1 in part because much of
Justice Story's argument is circular and unconvincing. But Justice Story's
conclusion was, in the end, correct. The notion of a national tribunal
capable of resolving, with national uniformity, issues of national interest
was

familiar

to

the

founding

generation

from

the

Articles

of

Confederation onward.1 32 And if the "all Cases" language at the beginning of Section 2 of Article III is tacitly limited to "all Cases brought in

federal court and excluding cases brought in state court," the same must
surely be true a fortiori of the language elsewhere in Section 2 extending
the federal judicial power to various "Controversies," most notably including controversies involving states. 133 It makes no structural sense to cre-

ate federal jurisdiction over such a class of cases that could be circumvented by an interested state through the simple expedient of ensuring
that the cases are first brought in the state's own courts. Furthermore, if

Section 2 of Article III truly reads "all Cases brought in federal court and
not cases brought in state court," then the Supreme Court could never,
even with the aid of congressional statutes, hear appeals from state

courts. The Sweeping Clause only permits Congress to pass laws "for carrying into Execution" powers vested by the Constitution in some federal
institution, and if Article III by its terms is limited only to cases brought in
federal court, Congress could not carry that power into execution by giv-

ing the Supreme Courtjurisdiction over state court cases. We agree with
Justice Story that the balance of arguments strongly tips in favor of federal authority to review state court judgments involving federal issues, so
that "all Cases" must have another meaning.
A third and far more plausible possibility is that the language of Article III includes only "all Cases brought within the federal judicial system,"
but that it does not categorically exclude cases brought in state court if

Congress has chosen to "constitute" state courts as part of the federal
judicial hierarchy. That is, Article III might extend the federal judicial
power to "all Cases brought before courts that are part of the federal
judicial system, either because they are federal courts ordained and established by Congress or because they are tribunals inferior to the Supreme
129. See supra note 18.
130. 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 305-06 (1816).
131. See id. at 331-42 (concluding that Supreme Court may review state court
judgments involving federal law).
132. See id. at 347-48 (describing need for uniform national resolution of certain
questions, such as treaty interpretation).
133. See U.S. Const. art. III, § 2.
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Court that Congress has included within the federal judicial system." On

this understanding, Congress retains the ultimate power to determine
whether state court judgments are reviewable in the Supreme Court. Because Article I enumerates a congressional power to "constitute Tribunals
inferior to the Supreme Court," Congress can use its power under the
Sweeping Clause to carry into effect the Tribunals Clause power by authorizing Supreme Court review of state judgments. But absent a congressional designation of a state court as part of the federal judicial sys-

tem, such a state court would stand to the Supreme Court in much the
same position as a court of Finland or Australia. This is essentially the
view put forward by Professor Pfander.1 3 4
A fourth possibility is that the words "all Cases" in Section 2 of Article
III mean "all Cases brought in courts that are within the political jurisdiction of the American Constitution," which would include both federal
and state courts. On this reading, the mandatory vesting of jurisdiction
in the Supreme Court would extend to state court cases encompassed
within the first three heads of federal jurisdiction in Article III by constitutional command, with or without a congressional designation of the
relevant state court as part of the federal judicial hierarchy. But if the
Constitution already gives the Supreme Court power to review judgments
of state courts that raise issues of federal law, what purpose is served by
the Tribunals Clause, which allows Congress to make state courts part of
the federal judicial hierarchy? The answer is that the federal judicial hierarchy entails more than simply the ability of the Supreme Court to review judgments of lower courts. The Supreme Court, by virtue of its position at the top of the judicial hierarchy, can bind inferior courts to follow

its pronouncements through the doctrine of vertical precedent 3 5 and
can exercise whatever ancillary supervisory powers the Supreme Court
may have. Under this view, without a congressional designation of a state
court as a "Tribunal[ ] inferior to the supreme Court," state courts may
be reversed by the Supreme Court on issues of federal law, but they are
under no obligation to follow the Supreme Court's precedents-no more
than is the President, the Congress, a state legislature, or any other body
that is not an inferior court or tribunal. Nor can it be supervised or directed by the Supreme Court in any way. But once Congress has made a
state court part of the federal judicial hierarchy, these collateral consequences kick in.

134. See Pfander, Judicial Power, supra note 20, at 672-89.
135. Professor Lawson's grave doubts about the constitutionality of horizontal
precedent do not apply to the doctrine of verticalprecedent. If the Constitution wishes to
give one actor (the Supreme Court) the power to force other actors (inferior courts) to set
aside their own views on the meaning of the Constitution, it certainly may do so. Professor
Lawson simply does not believe that the Constitution has done any such thing at the
horizontal level-or, indeed, in any context other than the Supreme Court/inferior court
relationship.
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We think that the fourth interpretation, with its constitutionally
vested jurisdiction in the Supreme Court, is the most plausible interpretation of Article III. For reasons that we have already given, a literal interpretation of the words "all Cases" cannot be right; the Constitution is
plainly not giving the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over Swiss or
Nigerian cases that arise under American federal law. Nor can the normal "federal only" background rule of constitutional interpretation apply
to Article III. Unless Martin v. Hunter's Lessee was wrongly decidedwhich is a result far more startling than anything we suggest here-Article III must include at least some cases brought initially in state court.
Thus the choice of plausible interpretations of Section 2 of Article

III is between either "all Cases brought in courts that are within the federal judicial hierarchy, either because the courts are federal courts ordained and established by Congress or because they are state courts that
Congress has constituted as tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court" or
"all Cases brought in courts within the political jurisdiction of the

American Constitution." Both possibilities require significant interpolations of the actual language of Article III, but the latter is closer to the
textual command "all Cases" and is therefore preferable. Once the
phrase "all Cases" is cut loose from the presumption that it refers exclusively to cases brought in federal courts, the only principle limiting the
scope of the language is the jurisdictional reach of the American

Constitution.
We can now understand why the Constitution contains a Tribunals
Clause allowing Congress to constitute tribunals inferior to the Supreme
Court but no "Administrators Clause" allowing Congress to constitute executive officials inferior to the President. The power to create executive
officials stems from the Sweeping Clause, which authorizes Congress to
enact laws that are necessary and proper for carrying into execution, inter alia, the President's executive power. Laws creating subordinates to
help the President in those duties obviously are paradigmatic laws under
this clause. A law designating state officials as federal officers and thus
conscripting state officials into the service of the President, however, is
another matter. Even if such a law could somehow survive review as "necessary," it would hardly be "proper" for Congress to take over state institutions in this fashion.1 36 By the same token, it would not be "proper" for
Congress, under the Sweeping Clause, to commandeer state judicial institutions either. Instead, a specific constitutional authorization beyond the

general grant of power in the Sweeping Clause was necessary to allow
Congress to impose upon state courts the burden of subservience to the

Supreme Court. The Tribunals Clause represents a huge grant of power
to Congress, made necessary by the Madisonian compromise that neither

136. This is why the anti-commandeering cases are properly (no pun intended)
grounded in the Sweeping Clause. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 923-24
(1997).
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directly created nor directly mandated the creation of inferior federal
courts.
There is one textual puzzle remaining to be solved. The Article III
Vesting Clause speaks of "Courts," while the Tribunals Clause, per its
name, speaks of "Tribunals." What is the significance of this difference in

wording? Professor James Pfander has addressed this question at length
in an important article.

His conclusion is that the "Tribunals" in the

Tribunals Clause include such institutions as territorial courts, courts
martial, and administrative adjudicators.1 37 For this premise, he develops
a comprehensive theory of the permissible scope of federal adjudication
by non-Article III bodies. 138 While it is a vast understatement to say that
we admire his effort, we think it is more likely that the "Tribunals" in the
Tribunals Clause are simply Article III federal courts and state courts.

As far as we can tell, the terms "courts" and "tribunals" were generally used interchangeably during the founding era. 139 If there is no significance to the difference in wording in Articles I and III, then Article I
only describes a power to create federal courts (in accordance with Arti-

cle III norms by virtue of the Article III Vesting Clause) or to designate an
existing institution as part of the federal judiciary. It would be structur-

ally bizarre to allow Congress to designate federal institutions other than
Article III federal courts to be part of the Article III judicial hierarchy, so
the best reading of the Tribunals Clause would include only Article III
federal courts and state courts. For Professor Pfander's theory to work,
the terms "Tribunals" and "Courts" must bear different meanings. We

believe that there is a good case that they do in fact bear different meanings, but those meanings support our position rather than Professor
Pfander's.
A "tribunal," according to Samuel Johnson, is "1.

The seat of a

judge.... 2. A court ofjustice." 140 These are the sorts of institutions that
Congress may "constitute" under its Tribunals Clause power. A "court,"
on the other hand, includes "7. Any jurisdiction, military, civil, or ecclesiastical." 14 1 Thus, perhaps counterintuitively, the term "court" in the
eighteenth century appears to have had a broader meaning than the term

"tribunal." In the context of the Constitution, the sorts of institutions
that might be "courts" but not "tribunals" could include such things as
the territorial judges, courts martial, and administrative adjudicators on
which Professor Pfander focuses. Indeed, the use of the word "courts" in
the phrase "courts martial" points strongly in this direction. On this reading of the Tribunals Clause and the Article III Vesting Clause, Congress has
no power to create or in any way designate courts martial, administrativeadjudicators, or territorialjudges under Article I, Section 8, Clause 9, because the
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

See Pfander, Judicial Power, supra note 20, at 672-89.
See id. at 747-74.
See id. at 677-78.
Johnson, supra note 55.
Id.
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Tribunals Clause power extends only to regular courts ("Tribunals"), ei-

ther federal or state. This makes excellent sense, because federal power
with respect to the institutions that are courts-but-not-tribunals stems
neither from the
create territorial
Property Clause
Columbia, from

Tribunals Clause nor from Article III. The power to
courts comes straight from the Territory and Other
in the case of the District of
of Article IV14 2-or,
the District Clause. 14 3 These provisions constitute

Congress as a general government over federal territory, 144 which means
that Congress need not rely on its other particularized enumerations of

power, such as the Tribunals Clause, when legislating for territories or
the District. The congressional power to create territorial legislatures
and executives obviously stems from Article IV or the District Clause; the

natural conclusion is that the power to create territorial judges comes
from the same source. Similarly, administrative adjudicators, as with all
other executive officers other than the President and Vice President, are
created pursuant to the Sweeping Clause rather than the Tribunals
Clause. Finally, courts martial are created either by Congress under the
Sweeping Clause through implementation of its powers "To make Rules
for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces"14 5 and
for "disciplining[ ] the Militia" 14 6 or by the President pursuant to the
grant of the "executive Power." The Tribunals Clause simply is not implicated in the creation of any of these institutions.
To the extent that such institutions are "courts," however, then they
must, if created by Congress, conform to the dictates of Article III, which
makes clear that all "inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to
time ordain and establish" must have tenure during good behavior and
guarantees against diminishment in salary while in office. Thus, if Congress uses its District Clause or Article IV power to create territorial

courts, those courts must satisfy the dictates of Article III-a proposition
that one of us has long championed on other grounds. 14 7 Similarly, if

Congress creates administrative adjudicative

bodies that qualify as

"courts," those bodies must also conform to Article 111.148 Finally, if Con-

&

142. "The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and
Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United
States . . . ." U.S. Const. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
143. "The Congress shall have Power . .. To exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases
whatsoever, over such District ... ." Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 17.
144. See Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, The Constitution of Empire: Territorial
Expansion and American Legal History 122, 128, 189-90 (2004) [hereinafter Lawson
Seidman, Empire].
145. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 14.
146. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 16.
147. See Lawson & Seidman, Empire, supra note 144, at 139-50; Gary Lawson,
Territorial Governments and the Limits of Formalism, 78 Cal. L. Rev. 853, 887-93 (1990).
148. The extent to which executive adjudication shades into an exercise of the
judicial power is one of the most difficult questions in constitutional law, and we hurriedly
run away from it here. For some very tentative thoughts, in which the author has very little
confidence, see Lawson, Rise and Rise, supra note 101, at 1246-47.
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gress creates courts martial or other military courts, they too must seem-

ingly satisfy Article III (because the term "Courts" includes military jurisdictions).

However, such bodies would not have to satisfy Article III if

they were created by the President pursuant to the "executive Power" because Article III only covers courts that are ordained and established by
Congress. Thus, the distinction between tribunals and courts may in fact

shed some light on the ancient puzzle of the permissible limits of adjudication by non-Article III bodies, though we leave a full analysis of this
problem for another day.

One possible consequence of the tribunals/courts distinction for our
present purpose is that it may forbid Congress from designating state administrative bodies as inferior federal tribunals. Congress's Tribunals
Clause power extends only to tribunals, which means, in the state context, only to state courts of justice rather than to all state adjudicative
bodies. Congress may thus have more power to "commandeer" state
courts than to "commandeer" state administrative agencies, in which case
the Supreme Court's case law to this effect at least vectors in the right
direction.149

D. Summing Up
Congress can "constitute" tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court or
it can "ordain and establish" inferior courts, but it cannot either create or
designate ajudicial body equal or superior to the Supreme Court. If Article III ended with Section 2, Paragraph 2's designation of the Supreme

Court's original and appellate jurisdiction, there would be no doubt that
stripping the Supreme Court of its appellate jurisdiction over federal
cases, by committing final determinations either to state courts or to inferior federal courts, would be unconstitutional. We have thus far, how-

ever, cut off the story in the middle of Article III.
II. ExCEPTIONAL

AUTHORITY

Justice Scalia's strong commitment to a hierarchical understanding
of the inferior/superior relationship in Article II seems to commit him as
well to a hierarchical understanding of the inferior/superior relationship
in Article III. If that relationship forbids jurisdiction stripping, at least in
those instances in which the Constitution extends the federal judicial
power to "all cases," then Justice Scalia's assertion of categorical congres-

sional authority to engage in jurisdiction stripping would seem to be
prima facie wrong.
149. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 907-08 (1997) (holding that Congress
has more power to impose duties on state judges than on state administrators); cf. Testa v.
Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 394 (1947) (holding, correctly under our analysis, that Congress may
direct state courts to hear federal cases).
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Justice Scalia's response in Hamdan was to invoke the following
clause at the conclusion of Section 2 of Article III, popularly known as the

Exceptions Clause:
In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and
Consuls, and those in which a State shall be Party, the supreme
Court shall have original Jurisdiction. In all the other Cases before
mentioned, the supreme Court shall have appellateJurisdiction, both as
to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as
the Congress shall make.1 5 0
Justice Scalia is not the only textualist to read this italicized provision

as plainly empowering Congress to remove cases from the Supreme
Court's jurisdiction (perhaps subject to limitations derived from elsewhere in the Constitution). 151 But a closer look at this clause reveals
some critical flaws in this analysis.
The "Exceptions" referred to in the clause are, it is clear, exceptions
to the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction. 15 2 But what happens to
cases formerly within the Supreme Court's jurisdiction when Congress
makes such exceptions? The conventional wisdom is that such cases disappear from the Supreme Court's jurisdiction altogether. We think, however, that the Exceptions Clause describes a much less dramatic maneuver: Congress makes "Exceptions" to the Supreme Court's appellate
jurisdiction when it adds those cases to the Court's originaljurisdiction.
The Exceptions Clause contemplates that Congress might move cases
back and forth between the Court's original and appellate jurisdiction,
but does not contemplate that the Supreme Court will be totally deprived
of jurisdiction over cases within the mandatory jurisdiction of the federal
courts. 153 When read without the groove that Marbury v. Madison and the
Judiciary Act of 1789 have worn in our minds, this reading of the Excep-

tions Clause makes perfect sense.
First, this reading comports with the reading of the Tribunals Clause
and the Article III Vesting Clause that we have just outlined, whereas
Justice Scalia's reading of the Exceptions Clause as a power to strip the
Supreme Court of jurisdiction altogether puts that clause in sharp ten150. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 2 (emphasis added).
151. See, e.g., Harrison, Limit the Jurisdiction, supra note 63, at 209. People who
champion a broad congressional power to regulate the Supreme Court's jurisdiction under
the Exceptions Clause can find limits under other rubrics, such as due process or equal
protection. See, e.g., Martin H. Redish, Congressional Power to Regulate Supreme Court
Appellate Jurisdiction Under the Exceptions Clause: An Internal and External
Examination, 27 Vill. L. Rev. 900, 902-03 (1982).
152. As a grammatical matter, it is possible that the exceptions are not to jurisdiction
per se but merely to that jurisdiction's inclusion of matters of both law and fact. On this
reading, Congress could not remove cases altogether from the Supreme Court's
jurisdiction but could limit Supreme Court review to law only (or perhaps fact only).
Because this interpretation has not been historically predominant, we do not address it.
153. In fact, an earlier version of the clause explicitly gave Congress the power to
move cases back and forth between the Supreme Court's original and its appellate
jurisdiction. See Clinton, supra note 73, at 773.
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sion with the rest of the constitutional structure. It is possible, of course,

that the Constitution contains such a sharp tension-and contains one
that is generated by ambiguous language at the end of a clause defining
the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court-but it is a reading that
should be compelled rather than preferred.
Second, when read as we propose, the two sentences of the second
paragraph of Article III, Section 2 fit together like a glove. The first sentence sets out a minimal, irreducible baseline of cases over which the

Supreme Court "shall"-that is, must-have original jurisdiction: cases
"affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and those in
which a State shall be Party." Note that all of these categories of cases or
controversies involve politically sensitive matters of either foreign policy

or federalism which ought to be tried as an original matter at the seat of
the government in Washington, D.C. The second sentence of this paragraph then says, "In all the other Cases before mentioned, the supreme

Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such
Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make." The

phrase "the other Cases before mentioned" clearly refers back to the nine
heads of jurisdiction mentioned in the first paragraph of Article III, Section 2. We thus know for a fact that this critical sentence is meant to be

read in the context of the rest of Article III, Section 2. The sentence then
ends by saying that whenever it does not have original jurisdiction, "the
supreme Court shall"-that is, must-"have appellate Jurisdiction, both as
to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions and under such Regulations as the
Congress shall make." The logical inference is that sentence two of this
paragraph should be read holistically with sentence one of the paragraph, so that when exceptions are made to the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction, the effect is to add to its original jurisdiction and not to
strip the Court of jurisdiction altogether. The obvious import of this
clause is to allocate jurisdiction between the Court's original and appellate jurisdiction; it would be passing strange if one of the possible allocations was "none of the above." Those like Justice Scalia who emphasize
the plain words of the Exceptions Clause need to read the clause together
with the sentence which precedes it and with the Tribunals Clause and
the Vesting Clause.
Read holistically, the constitutional text makes perfect sense. It says
that there must be one Supreme Court which will have the last word on

all questions of federal law; that this Court must have original jurisdiction
over a minimum of three categories of especially controversial cases; and
that it must have appellate jurisdiction over "all the other Cases before

mentioned" except where the Congress decides to add to the Supreme
Court's originaljurisdiction by making exceptions to or regulations of the
Court's appellate jurisdiction.

54

It makes far more sense to construe the

154. Why would the Framers have specified such an extensive but discretionary
appellate jurisdiction for the Supreme Court? There are several reasons. First, they did
not know whether Congress was going to create any inferior federal courts: Therefore it
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Exceptions Clause holistically in the manner just suggested rather than to
conclude that it granted Congress a power to give the "inferior" federal

courts or the state supreme courts the last word on a matter of federal
law. The state supreme courts are not even mentioned anywhere in Arti-

cle III. Why would the Constitution grant Congress the power to give
state courts, which Article III does not even mention, the last word on
questions involving the meaning of federal law? The allegedly "literal"
reading of the Exceptions Clause is superficially plausible only if one
reads the Clause in isolation. Read together with the rest of Article III,

the Exceptions Clause most likely describes only the congressional "good
housekeeping" power to move cases back and forth between the original

and appellate jurisdictions of the Supreme Court.
There is a second, even more fundamental problem with reading the
Exceptions Clause to authorize Congress to remove jurisdiction from the
Supreme Court: The Exceptions Clause grants no such power because it
does not grant Congress any power at all! This conclusion is contrary to the
received wisdom, but the received wisdom is simply wrong. The textual,
structural, and historical case against reading the Exceptions Clause as a
grant of power has been most powerfully made in the modern literature
by David Engdahl in an important, and grossly overlooked, article that
first drew this central point to our attention. 155 Because the point is crucial to a proper understanding of the Constitution, we lay out in some
detail the case against reading the Exceptions Clause as a power grant.
Textually, the Exceptions Clause does not read like a grant of power.
It does not say, "Congress shall have power to make exceptions and regu-

lations to the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction." Instead, the clause
seems to recognize that power to make exceptions and regulations to the
Court's appellate jurisdiction has been elsewhere granted, and the clause is

simply acknowledging the possible exercise of that power as a limitation
on what would otherwise be a categorical grant to the Supreme Court of

either original or appellate jurisdiction over every case within the federal
judicial power. In this respect, the clause is like the Suspension Clause,
which recognizes that Congress may at times suspend the writ of habeas

corpus but does not grant the power of suspension, and the Takings
would have made sense to give Congress a lot of discretion over the Supreme Court's
original and appellate jurisdiction. Second, the Framers were well aware that one of the
fears that people would have about the new federal court system was that they might be
sued in federal court and forced to travel on horseback thousands of miles to the seat of
government in Washington, D.C., to defend themselves. To alleviate that fear, which did
in fact get expressed loudly during the ratification debates, the Framers would have wanted
to make most of the Court's jurisdiction appellate while giving Congress the power to add
to the Court's original jurisdiction when the gravity of the case suggested a need that it do
so. Giving this power to Congress to add to the Court's original jurisdiction would have
seemed quite safe because Congress was the branch of the government closest to the
people, so it could be trusted not to force people to travel to Washington to litigate their
cases unless public necessity demanded it.
155. See Engdahl, Intrinsic Limits, supra note 25, at 119-26.
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Clause, which assumes that the federal government will at times take pri-

vate property for public use but does not itself grant the power of eminent domain. Indeed, the technique of referring to a power previously
granted appears elsewhere in Article III: Section

l's mention of "inferior

courts" is not a grant of power to Congress to create inferior courts but is
instead a cross-reference to any such inferior courts that Congress created
pursuant to its Tribunals Clause power in Article 1.156 The Exceptions

Clause, when approached without any historical baggage, is most plausibly read as a similar cross-reference.
The textual case against reading the Exceptions Clause as a grant of

power becomes even clearer when one contrasts (in a felicitous parallel)
Article III, Section 2, Clause 2 with Article II, Section 2, Clause 2. The
Appointments Clause of Article II says that the President

shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the
Senate, shall appoint [officers of the United States] ... but the
Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts
57
of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.1
This clause constitutionally vests a power-a jurisdiction, if you
will-in the President, and then specifically gives Congress, in unmistakably power-granting language, the ability to alter that baseline jurisdictional vesting. A parallel formulation of the Exceptions Clause would

read something like "In all the other Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact,
but the Congress may by Law make exceptions and regulations to the
supreme Court's jurisdiction." The actual language of the Exceptions

Clause is quite different from the power-granting language of the Appointments Clause.
The structural case for reading the Exceptions Clause as a grant of
power is even weaker. As Professor Engdahl put it:

For persons committed both to the separation of powers and to
the principle of enumerated powers, it would have been remark-

ably offhanded to grant to one branch hegemony over another
by two words placed as subordinate terms in prepositional
phrases. The framers were otherwise careful to articulate grants

of power in straightforward, unequivocal terms; for them to bestow by such indirection a power sufficient to cripple a coordinate branch would have been very peculiar.15 8
This is an understatement. The ability to remove one third of the
national government from the decisionmaking structure with the stroke
of a pen is an extraordinary power, and to find it buried at the end of a
156. See id. at 123-24 (noting language used elsewhere in Constitution to grant
power and calling into question plausibility of reading Exceptions Clause as grant of
power).
157. U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
158. Engdahl, Intrinsic Limits, supra note 25, at 123.

2007 ]

JURISDICTIONSTRIPPING AND HAMDAN

1041

clause whose principal focus is mandatory vesting of jurisdiction in the
Supreme Court over all federal cases is simply untenable.
If the Exceptions Clause references power but does not grant it,

from where does the acknowledged power to regulate the Supreme
Court's jurisdiction spring? The power to suspend habeas corpus and the
power of eminent domain both come from the Sweeping Clause. Similarly, the power to make "Exceptions" to the Supreme Court's appellate
jurisdiction (by expanding its original jurisdiction) also comes from the
Sweeping Clause. The clause gives Congress power to make all laws
which are "necessary and proper for carrying into Execution" the other
powers enumerated in the Constitution, including the judicial power
vested in the federal courts and the congressional powers to constitute
tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court and to ordain and establish inferior federal courts. We think that the Sweeping Clause is most likely the
source of all congressional power to pass jurisdictional statutes for the
courts.1 5 9 It would be surprising, therefore, if it were not also the source

of Congress's power to apportion the Supreme Court's original and appellate jurisdiction.

Once the Sweeping Clause is properly seen as the source of Congress's power to regulate federal court jurisdiction, it has important implications for the jurisdiction stripping debate. As we have already pointed

out,1 60 any laws enacted pursuant to the Sweeping Clause must "carry[ ]
into Execution" some federal power and must be "necessary and proper"
for that purpose. A law that moves some cases from the Supreme Court's
appellate jurisdiction and places them into its original jurisdiction can
obviously satisfy both concerns, but a law that removes a class of federal
cases altogether from the Supreme Court's jurisdiction fails dismally.
One can no more carry the judicial power into execution by stripping the
Supreme Court of the final word on a question of federal law than one
can carry the executive power into execution by stripping the President
of control over a special prosecutor. Conceivably, one could try to argue
that a law making a class of cases the exclusive province of the inferior
159. It is perhaps clearest that the power of Congress to pass statutes implementing
the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction comes from the Sweeping Clause. This simply
has to be the case since there is no other constitutional grant of power that could enable
Congress to legislate as to the Supreme Court's originaljurisdiction. (It is also obvious for
similar reasons that the Sweeping Clause empowers Congress to set the size and term of
court for the Supreme Court.)
As to the inferior federal courts, it is of course possible that the power to "ordain and
establish" them includes the power to set their jurisdiction, but this seems technically
unlikely. The act of "ordaining and establishing" an inferior federal court seems separate
from the act of granting that court its jurisdiction. We think the Constitution is best read
as empowering Congress to create inferior federal courts with the Ordain and Establish
Clause and to set their jurisdiction with the Sweeping Clause. Admittedly, this is not the
only nor even the usual reading that can be given to the constitutional language on
congressional power to establish the jurisdiction of the inferior federal courts, but it makes
the most sense of the constitutional language and structure.
160. See supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text.
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federal courts is somehow "for carrying into Execution" the Tribunals
Clause, but this would confound the plain meaning of the Constitution.
The Tribunals Clause authorizes Congress to "constitute Tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court." It is very hard to see how giving an inferior
court power that cannot be reviewed by the Supreme Court helps carry
into effect the power to create "inferior" tribunals-which is the only
power conferred by the Tribunals Clause. For the same reason, Congress

cannot "carry[ ] into Execution" the President's executive power by creating executive officers who do not answer to the President.
Second, any law enacted pursuant to the Sweeping Clause must be
"necessary and proper" for executing some federal power. We will not
engage here what is required for a law to be "necessary" (though one of
us has argued at some length that the standard for necessity prescribed by
the Constitution-and quite possibly contemplated by Chief Justice
Marshall in McCulloch v. Maryland16 1-is stricter than modern doctrine
supposes16 2 ), because a law stripping the Supreme Court of constitutionally vested jurisdiction is not "proper." A "proper" law must respect the
structure of federalism, separation of powers, and individual rights embodied in the Constitution,16 3 and if we are right about the role of the
Supreme Court under the Constitution, a law removing jurisdiction from
the Supreme Court rather than allocating it between the Court's original
and appellate jurisdiction undoes that structure. It is akin to a statute
that tries to strip the President of his power to remove or control a
subordinate in the executive department, which is equally improper.

When Exceptions Clause cases are correctly understood to be Sweeping Clause cases, it becomes clear that stripping the Supreme Court of
both its original and appellate jurisdiction over federal cases is neither
"proper" nor "carrying into Execution" any federal power. There simply
is no enumerated congressional power to remove cases from the

Supreme Court's jurisdiction. The Exception Clause's reference to exceptions and regulations does not provide a credible textualist grounding
for such a power. For these reasons, there is nothing in the Constitution

which defeats the inference drawn from the Tribunals Clause and the
Article III Vesting Clause that jurisdiction stripping is always unconstitutional in disputes over which the Supreme Court is granted jurisdiction in

"all cases."

III. PRACTICE DOES NOT

ALWAYS MAKE PERFECT

The obvious rejoinder to our argument that Congress may move
cases between the Supreme Court's original and appellate jurisdiction is
161. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 413-15 (1819) (arguing that "necessary" means
"calculated to produce the end").
162. See Lawson, Discretion, supra note 67, at 242-48.
163. See id. at 255-64 (arguing that laws delegating too much discretion are not
"proper"); Lawson & Granger, supra note 67, at 291-326 (discussing meaning of "proper"
and jurisdictional meaning of Sweeping Clause).
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to dismiss it as inconsistent with the bedrock holding of Marbur v.

Madison-a cornerstone of our whole judicial system-that Congress cannot expand the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction.'64 This rejoinder
essentially says to discard the plain meaning of the text of the
Constitution because precedent demands that we do so-much as it is
often argued that because we have had substantive due process precedents for over 100 years, we should therefore abandon the constitutional
text which suggests that those cases have mangled the plain meaning of
the Due Process Clause.

Many Supreme Court Justices might be able to argue for precedent
over text, but we are unwilling to go along with this. One of us takes
seriously the idea that following precedent over the Constitution may itself be unconstitutional. 165 The other does not agree, but at least regards
the constitutional text as controlling in all but the most extraordinary
circumstances. 166 This circumstance is not extraordinary. After all,
Marbury's dicta upholding congressional limits on the president's removal power 167 was rightly discarded in Myers v. United States.168 There is
no reason why Marbury's holding that Congress cannot add to the
Supreme Court's original jurisdiction should fare any better.
Even by conventional standards of precedent, which we do not endorse, the case for adherence to Marbury in this respect is weak. There
has been essentially no reliance on Marbury's 200-plus-year-old holding
that Congress cannot add to the original jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court. In contrast, there are substantial reliance interests that are impli-

cated by reading the Exceptions Clause as granting Congress the power
to strip the Supreme Court totally of jurisdiction over cases. The thing
that makes Marbury foundational and memorable is not its holding as to

congressional power to add to the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction
but its defense of judicial review.

Overruling the holding of Marbury

&

164. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 173-76 (1803).
165. See Gary Lawson, The Constitutional Case Against Precedent, 17 Harv. J.L.
Pub. Pol'y 23, 27-28 (1994) (asserting that Marbury's reasoning applies to judicial review of
prior judicial action); Gary Lawson, Mostly Unconstitutional: The Case Against Precedent
Revisited, 5 Ave Maria L. Rev. (forthcoming 2007) (arguing that Court should "mostly
never" choose precedent over text of Constitution).
166. See Steven G. Calabresi, Text, Precedent, and the Constitution: Some
Originalist and Normative Arguments for Overruling Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey, 22 Const. Comment. 311, 328 (2005) (stating that precedent should
be followed over Constitution only where text is vague and all three branches of
government are content with governing precedent).
167. If Marbury, as an executive official, was subject to plenary removal by the
President, then there could not have been any issue about his entitlement to a commission
because President Jefferson's refusal to deliver the commission was an effective removal
from office. Chief Justice Marshall accordingly noted on five separate occasions that
Marbury could not be removed at will. See Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 156, 157, 162,
167, 172.
168. See 272 U.S. 52, 139-40 (1926) (finding that Marbury is not controlling with
respect to removal power).
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would actually protect the institution of judicial review from jurisdiction

stripping. It would be better to jettison Marbury and safeguard judicial
review than to jettison judicial review and safeguard Marbury.
The fact of the matter is that scholars have long recognized that
Marbury was a highly questionable and political ruling by a very political
ChiefJustice, issued at a time when the Supreme Court was badly beleaguered and under attack. 16 9 Many scholars have argued, rightly in our
view, that Marshall misread the congressional statute at issue in Marbury
as adding to the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction, 170 and it would
not be surprising if Marshall misread the Constitution at the same
time. 171

Alternatively, one could retain the Marbury precedent even though it
is wrong but decline to construe the Exceptions Clause as allowing Congress to give the last word in federal question cases to entities other than
the Supreme Court. But just because the Court in Marbury misread the
Original Jurisdiction Clause is no reason for it also to misread the Exceptions Clause. One could perfectly well leave Marbury in place but decline
to allow its gravitational force to turn the Exceptions Clause into a threat

to judicial review that it was not meant to be.
Another argument from practice that is likely to be made in opposition to our argument is that, since the Judiciary Act of 1789, Congress has

passed laws purporting to make exceptions to the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction. Because the Judiciary Act of 1789 was passed by the First
Congress, a body filled with many of the Framers, the Act itself has long
been thought to be an especially significant gloss on the constitutional
text. Surely, it might be argued, a practice so venerable that it dates back
to 1789 cannot seriously be impugned as being unconstitutional.

We plan to address this topic at greater length in a subsequent work,
but for present purposes three short comments are sufficient. First, the
authority of the Judiciary Act of 1789 as an interpretation of the
Constitution should not be overestimated.

Marbury, after all, declared

unconstitutional a portion of the Judiciary Act of 1789, so it was evidently
not beyond the ken of the founding generation that the First Congress
might be a fallible constitutional interpreter. The First Congress's proximity to the ratification of the Constitution is interesting and relevant but
not decisive. It is not uncommon for Congress to pass laws inconsistent

with

recently

enacted

constitutional

provisions.

Indeed,

the

Reconstruction Congress did precisely this when it provided for segre169. See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, The Failure of the Founding Fathers: Jefferson,
Marshall, and the Rise of Presidential Democracy 8 (2005) ("Rather than a ringing
vindication ofjudicial power, it was part of a large strategic retreat, rationalizing a stunning
judicial concession to the Republicans' proud claim to a mandate from the People.").
170. See, e.g., Amar, America's Constitution, supra note 106, at 232.
171. Professor Amar, to be sure, defends Marshall's understanding of the
constitutional scope of the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction, see id. at 231-32, but he
does so largely based on historical and consequentialist arguments.
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gated schooling in the District of Columbia at the same time that it
barred racial discrimination by passing the Fourteenth Amendment.17 2
This kind of disjunction between contemporaneous constitutional provisions and implementing legislation should not be surprising. Even if
there is some degree of overlap between the constitution-making and

constitution-implementing bodies, as there was in the founding era, legislators have very different incentives, and operate under very different institutional restraints, than do constitutional drafters or ratifiers. The authors of the Judiciary Act of 1789, for instance, included many AntiFederalists elected to the First Congress who were hostile to the new system of national courts. As a result, it would not be surprising if the Judiciary Act of 1789 contained compromises with Anti-Federalists that were in
tension with the nationalizing thrust of Article III; for example, the new
inferior federal courts were given no federal question jurisdiction,1 73 and
the new Supreme Court was not statutorily confirmed in the full extent of
its federal question jurisdiction. Why should we today defer to the AntiFederalist-influenced Judiciary Act of 1789 rather than enforcing the

plain words of the Constitution? Nor should one exaggerate the significance of actions taken by the First Congress. While that body was capable
of sophisticated constitutional debate that puts our modern lawmakers to
shame, 174 it was also capable of error. There is no good reason to prefer
the constitutional gloss of the Judiciary Act of 1789 to the plain words of
the Constitution. The touchstone must always be the Constitution, not
what anyone in particular, including the First Congress, says about the
Constitution.

172. Recent originalist scholarship has concluded, from several different directions,
that segregated public schools violate the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., Michael W.
McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decision, 81 Va. L. Rev. 947, 1099 (1995)
("[T]he weight of the evidence supports the proposition that segregation was understood
in the years prior to the end of Reconstruction to be unconstitutional .... "); Michael W.
McConnell, The Originalist Justification for Brown: A Reply to Professor Klarman, 81 Va.
L. Rev. 1937, 1954 (1995) (asserting that Brown v. Board of Education actually reflects
original meaning of Fourteenth Amendment); Steven G. Calabresi & Michael Perl, A
Formalist-Originalist Defense of Brown v. Board of Education 17-55 (May 3, 2004)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the Columbia Law Review) (using evidence from year
in which Fourteenth Amendment was passed to argue that original intent of Fourteenth
Amendment supports unconstitutionality of segregated public schools).
173. Actually, Professor Engdahl has seriously questioned this bit of conventional
wisdom. If one does not begin with the incredibly (though not necessarily improperly)
broad view of "arising under" jurisdiction reflected in Osborn v. Bank of the United States,
22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 823 (1824) (finding Bank of the United States charter to arise
under federal law), there are actually very few cases within Article III over which the
Judiciary Act did not confer federaljurisdiction. See Engdahl, Intrinsic Limits, supra note
25, at 136-38. If Professor Engdahl is right about this, our case is even stronger.
174. For example, the debate in the First Congress concerning the presidential
removal power was a constitutional tour de force. See Saikrishna Prakash, New Light on
the Decision of 1789, 91 Cornell L. Rev. 1021, 1042-61 (2006) (describing and analyzing
congressional enactment of Foreign Affairs Act).
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Second, we think that the practice is actually more consistent with
our analysis than it might seem at first glance. The so-called early "exceptions" to the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction were all implied exceptions from affirmative language that granted jurisdiction over some
class of cases and were taken by implication to exclude jurisdiction over
others.175 This kind of argument by implication, we think, commits
profound error. If we are right that the Exceptions Clause is not a grant
of power, and that Congress's power over Supreme Court jurisdiction
stems solely from its power under the Sweeping Clause to make necessary
and proper laws for carrying into execution the Supreme Court'sjudicial
power, then Congress only has the power to pass affirmative laws defining

(to the extent of Congress's power) the scope of the Supreme Court's
original and appellate jurisdiction or laws confirming or clarifying the
Court's constitutionally granted jurisdiction. Congress could not pass a negative law simply denying the Supreme Court jurisdiction, either original or appellate, over a class of cases within the Constitution's mandatory jurisdiction, and
until fairly recently Congress did not try. Thus a typical so-called exercise of

Congress's Exceptions Clause power over the Supreme Court is Congress's failure in the Judiciary Act of 1789 to make federal criminal convictions reviewable by the Supreme Court.1 76 But this is not an exercise
of a putative congressional Exceptions Clause power. It is simply a failure
on the part of Congress to execute fully the judicial power conferred by
Article III. Theoretically, the Supreme Court could have exercised power
over such cases even though the jurisdictional statutes did not provide for
it by falling back on its constitutional grant of appellate jurisdiction in all
the other cases before mentioned. It is true that the Court never to our
knowledge assumed constitutional jurisdiction over such a case where the
jurisdictional statutes did not provide for it, but that does not mean that

the Court could not have done so. In fact, there is no practice of Congress overturning Supreme Court decisions by passing jurisdictional laws
by a simple majority in this country. If it is practice that counts, surely it

has not been our practice to uphold challenged jurisdiction stripping
bills as being constitutional.
Our account of congressional power explains one of the puzzles
raised by the traditional reading of the Exceptions Clause: Why are Congress's statutes governing the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction writ175. See, e.g., Durousseau v. United States, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 307, 313 (1810)
("[Congress] ha[s] described affirmatively its jurisdiction, and this affirmative jurisdiction
has been understood to imply a negative on the exercise of such appellate power as is not
comprehended within it."); United States v. More, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 159, 173-74 (1805)
("[T]he jurisdiction of the court ...
has been regulated by congress, and an affirmative
description of its power must be understood as a regulation .. . prohibiting the exercise of
other powers than those described.").
176. On the failure of Congress to provide for Supreme Court review of federal
criminal convictions until 1889, see John Harrison, The Power of Congress over the Rules
of Precedent, 50 Duke LJ. 503, 514 (2000); Ann Woolhandler, Demodeling Habeas, 45
Stan. L. Rev. 575, 587 (1993).
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ten in the affirmative rather than as exercises of a congressional power to
make exceptions?

Our account of Article III can answer that question

more fully than competing accounts. We think that the reason congressional statutes are written as affirmative grants ofjurisdiction rather than

as negative exceptions away from the constitutional grant of jurisdiction
is because Congress enacts these statutes pursuant to its power to carry
into execution the judicial power conferred by Article III. The statutes

governing the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction are not exercises of
some negative power conferred by the Exceptions Clause.
Once the Sweeping Clause is seen as the source of congressional
power to regulate Supreme Court jurisdiction, no negative implication
should be drawn from an affirmative statute confirming jurisdiction over

some cases but not others, because when Congress passes laws "for carrying into Execution" the powers of other governmental actors, it need not
do so to the full extent of its constitutionalpowers. If Congress passes a statute
authorizing the President to conduct a certain form of intelligence gathering during wartime, that statute does not foreclose the President's use
of whatever powers of intelligence gathering are directly granted by the
Article II Vesting Clause. Congress can, to the extent of its constitutional
power, supplement the President's inherent constitutional authority, but
it cannot limit this authority, either directly or by implication. Similarly,

Congress can help clarify or implement whatever power is directly
granted to the Supreme Court by the Constitution, but it cannot limit this
power, either directly or by implication. Statutes that affirmatively describe the Supreme Court's jurisdiction, but that do not describe it to its
full extent, are wholly consistent with the constitutional framework as we
understand it. The weight of historical practice, including the statutes
enacted by the First Congress, is actually very well explained by our
analysis.
CONCLUSION

Justice Scalia's (and the Bush Administration's) views on Article II,
which emphasize that Congress cannot derogate from the constitutional

grants of authority to the President, are in considerable tension with their
views on Article III, which seem to contemplate a wide congressional

power to derogate from the constitutional grants of authority to the
Supreme Court. Justice Scalia's position on Article II is correct, and it
applies as well to Article III. Congress can determine whether the
Supreme Court will have original or appellate jurisdiction over federal
cases, but it cannot determine whether the Supreme Court will have jurisdiction at all. The Constitution has already done that.
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